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Introduction 
 
Over the last thirty years, China has undergone comprehensive and profound social and 
economic transformation. The rapid development of urbanization, marketization, 
informatization and globalization has brought China a series of major challenges. These 
include how to adjust the relationship between the state, market and society; how to narrow 
the gap between rich and poor; how to build and improve the social welfare system; how to 
protect and improve the ecological environment; and how to reform and innovate the system 
of government and governance. At the same time, Britain, on the other side of the world, faces 
serious problems: such as its departure from the EU, declining trust in government, refugee 
crises and problems of social integration, and the retrenchment of the social welfare system. 
 
As a popular adage says, “To learn from others’ experience can better oneself”. In the 
era of globalization, China’s road of modernization is not only inseparable from the experience 
of developed countries, but also provides the world with a unique insight on development and 
welfare: one with a ‘Chinese flavour’. International academic exchanges and cooperation are 
important parts of the internationalization process.  
 
In order to promote academic exchange and cooperation between China and Britain, 
scholars from the Institute of Sociology of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences – led by 
Dr Xiao Lin - and the School of Social Science of Cardiff University, led by Professor Sin Yi 
Cheung, successfully secured funding from the British Academy under the CASS-BA Newton 
Advanced Fellowship scheme in 2016. The broad theme of the project was ‘Social Welfare 
and Local Governance: A comparative perspective between China and Britain’. Along with 
Social Policy and Local Governance: Developments in Europe and China (社会政策与地方治
理：欧洲和中国的经验, Social Science Academic Press, Beijing, 2019), the four papers in this 
publication are key outputs from the CASS-Cardiff University collaboration. Written by leading 
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CASS scholars, each paper provides new insights into issues of welfare, development and 
urbanization in contemporary China. 
 
By engaging with these issues, the chapters in this volume provide a timely, empirically 
grounded engagement, with a raft of social theory. Foremost is the burgeoning body of 
academic work on ‘governance’. Towards the end of the twentieth century, new ways of 
governing emerged in Western countries that involved greater use of non-state actors. The 
term ‘governance’ is now employed to capture the idea that governing does not rest on the 
authority and sanction of government alone (Gouldson and Bebbington, 2007; Bevir, 2013). 
This results in various forms of public-private-voluntary collaboration, including the use of 
private market and civil society actors for the delivery of social goods. These are variously 
captured in the associated literature on ‘welfare pluralism’ (Chaney and Wincott 2014) and 
‘new public governance’ (Osbourne, 2010). Importantly, work on ‘multi-level’ (Bache and 
Flinders, 2004) and ‘multi-spatial’ governance (Jessop, 2016) underlines how the form and 
function of governance varies according to geographical scale: ranging from international, 
national and sub-national (or regional) processes to those operating at the local or community 
level.  
 
The prevailing mix of governance styles can also differ across policy sectors and 
countries, as well as change over time (Baker, 2018). This is evident in the allied literature on 
welfare state theory (Pierson and Castles, 2000; Leibfried and Mau, 2008), which provides 
critical insight into the role of the state in promoting citizen wellbeing and the provision of social 
welfare. This literature, however, has been largely dominated by studies of Western states 
(Arts and Gelissen, 2002; Chau and Sam, 2011), especially where strong neoliberal belief in 
the effectiveness and efficiency of markets shapes the mix of governance styles used 
(Newman and McKee, 2005). In response, this volume analyses developments in the East.  
China presents an interesting and important case, where civil society is less 
autonomous from the state (Hsu and Hasmath, 2017). Although civil society in China cannot 
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be understood in conventional terms, the drive towards economic reform and modernization 
in the past 30 years has created new opportunities for citizen participation (Kerr, 2015). Here, 
new participatory practices socialize people into an ethic of citizenship, such as through the 
provision of social care at the community level (Ringen and Ngok, 2013). Yet the case of China 
also exhibits strong similarities to the West, where the state continues to act both as a 
coordinator and facilitator, while retaining its traditional regulatory and oversight roles (Carrillo 
Garcia, Beatriz, Hood, and Kadetz, 2017). 
 
The evidence from our empirical work on China shows how, as this change in 
governmentality plays out in practice, the opening-up of social spaces can both strengthen the 
bonds between the state and the polity, while simultaneously enhancing the capacity of the 
state to deliver on social goods (Sander et al, 2012). The research also points to the complexity 
of the relationship between civil society and the state and the need to think differently about 
how it is forged and developed outside Western contexts.  
 
These articles reflect the finished product after months of hard work of the CASS team 
and helpful comments and advice from senior colleagues of the Cardiff team. The editing and 
publishing of these working papers stand among the concrete achievements of our three 
years' communication and cooperation. We hope to use it as an opportunity to contribute our 
humble effort to promote international exchange and expand our academic horizons in related 
fields.  
 
Editors and contributors 
School of Social Sciences, WISERD, Sustainable Places Research Institute – Cardiff 
University & the Institute of Sociology, Chinese Academy of Social Science, Beijing. 
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1. Reconciling the People’s Will with Central Government’s Plan: Exploring the 
pursuit of local governance in today’s China 
 
Liu Yiran 
 
Abstract: In the wake of 18th and 19th Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee 
reforms on ‘social governance’, this paper will explore subsequent developments in Chinese 
local governance. This is an appropriate focus because earlier research has largely tended to 
overlook the challenges facing local government in balancing the requirements of upper level 
national government with the needs and will of society. By using interviews and participant 
observation to examine the case of Xicheng District Beijing, this paper finds that, when local 
government faces pressure from central government, it tends to downplay consideration of 
the people’s voice and instead uses monetary compensation to appease people’s anger at 
not being listened to. However, when local government is afforded more freedom, it is more 
likely to try and address people’s needs and demands and reconcile these with central 
government’s plan, to balance the needs of the two. The analysis of the post-2012 reforms 
identifies three Project Types to illustrate the emerging different approaches to local 
governance. Owing to government’s dominant role, Types One and Two are more akin to what 
empowerment theory dubs ‘collaborative betterment’. In contrast, Type Three projects give 
local communities far greater say in determining policy priorities and implementation methods. 
For this reason, they broadly resonate with the notion of ‘collaborative empowerment’, 
although ultimately government remains a veto player. A further key finding is that the pursuit 
of local governance is not exclusively reliant on central government’s plan, nor the demands 
of society; but to a significant degree, is shaped by the mediating role of local government 
officials.  
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Introduction  
In the wake of the 18th and 19th CPC Central Committees’ reforms on ‘social governance’, this 
paper explores subsequent developments in local governance in China. This is an appropriate 
focus because earlier research has largely tended to overlook the challenges facing local 
government in balancing the requirements of upper level, national government with the needs 
and will of society. Drawing on interviews, official documents and participant observation, it 
examines the case of Xicheng District, Beijing. As will be seen, the analysis of the post-2012 
reforms, identifies three Project Types which illustrate different approaches to local 
governance. Owing to government’s dominant role, Types One and Two are more akin to what 
empowerment theory dubs ‘collaborative betterment’. In contrast, Type Three projects give 
local communities far greater say in determining policy priorities and implementation methods. 
For this reason, they broadly resonate with the notion of ‘collaborative empowerment’, 
although ultimately government remains a veto player.  
Before considering the case study research, it is important to briefly trace the recent 
history of thinking on notions of society and governance. During the 30 years after 1949, China 
was a ‘holistic state’, with the economy, society and politics highly intertwined and controlled 
by the state. In urban China, the state exerted its power over individuals through Daiwei (also 
known as Work Units), which, as the major form of social management system, usually 
shouldered economic, social and political responsibilities. They provided their employees not 
only with salaries and subsidies, but also with social welfare and community activities.1  
After the reform and a series of ‘Opening Up’ policies in 1979, Chinese civil society 
gradually developed, with more private firms set up and social organizations formed. In 
consequence, many ambitious citizens started to look for jobs outside the Danwei system. 
Later, in the 1990s, due to the increasing welfare burden, many state-owned companies lost 
                                                          
1 The Danwei also exercised significant control on people’s lives. For example, if people wanted to 
travel around or get married, they had to get permission from their Danwei. 
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their competitive edge in the market and had to lay off workers in order to survive. With a 
significant number of people losing their jobs, the state felt the pressure of maintaining social 
and economic stability. In response, it started to use urban communities as a supplement to 
the Danwei system. Thenceforth, urban communities were to take the leading role in providing 
social services. However, despite its importance, ‘society’ had long been considered 
subordinate to the economy and politics in China, and was not seriously regarded as an 
independent domain until 2006. At this juncture, the concept of ‘harmonious society’ was 
officially put forward at the Six Plenary Session of the 16th CPC Central Committee. In 
consequence, now recognized as the basic unit of society, communities are getting more 
attention and resources from the state. Gradually, they have become the most important unit 
of social management. Although the organic, grassroots role of the community is emphasized 
in official policy, its affairs are still arranged by government in a top down fashion, with 
communities lacking autonomy of their own.  
In recent years, as a result of China’s rapid economic development, people’s living 
standards have improved, and their demands on authorities have diversified. For example, 
they not only need the government to provide for public services, but to do so in an impartial 
and negotiable manner. In the face of this change, the pre-existing, top down system of 
governance failed to adapt to the new social reality. Therefore, the Central Committee’s 
‘Decision on Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reforms’2, adopted at the 
Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee, put forward the new idea of 
replacing social management with ‘social governance’; that is, greater involvement of civil 
society. This was a significant reform because it emphasized that the government should play 
a guiding role in governance, encouraging and supporting all sectors of society to participate; 
rather than undertaking the whole task itself. The report of the 19th Congress also explicitly 
                                                          
2 An official document released by the central government on 15 November 2013. It concludes with an 
achievement summary of former reforms and guiding principles of future reforms. 
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requested that further reform and innovation should be applied to the social governance 
model; notably, creating a shared, co-built, co-governed structure of social governance. 
Responding to central government reforms, local governments have implemented a 
raft of different projects as the main way to fulfil people’s needs. The ‘Project System’, as 
scholars refer to it, has emerged as a commonly used method for governing in contemporary 
China (Qu, 2012). However, the reality of the Project System is very different from the vision 
set out in policy. Current practice is shaped by the fact that, whilst trying to encourage more 
people to participate in community development projects and join the co-governing process, 
local government has its own interests and challenges that are not always factored into 
consideration by the 19th Congress’ reforms. This is a key oversight: local government not only 
faces time and resource limitations, but is also subject to the pressure of being evaluated by 
upper level, central government. Furthermore, it shoulders the crucial responsibility of 
maintaining the stability of local society.  
Faced with these challenges, most of the time, experience shows it is hard for local 
government to build a social governance model that can both pass the evaluation of central 
government and meet the requirements of local residents. Given this, this article explores how 
local government attempts to reconcile competing pressures from central government and 
local communities in order to successfully implement China’s ‘Project System’ governance.   
The remainder of this paper is structured thusly: following a review of the relevant 
literature, and an outline of the methodology, attention centres on the empirical case studies 
to illustrate: 1. Under what circumstances different modes of local governance emerge; 2. 
Their effectiveness. The concluding discussion seeks to conceptualize the new modes of 
governance in today’s China: reflecting on lessons learned about local government’s 
implementation of projects under the new social governance model and to what extent they 
can give autonomy to local people.  
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Literature Review 
Existing work on local governance in China falls into two broad categories. One is from the 
perspective of government; the other is from the angle of society. In the first category, scholars 
mainly explore the relationship between different levels and sectors of government and the 
emergence of new forms of governance. For example, Zhou (2008) put forward the concepts 
of the “administrative subcontract” (2008) and “political tournament” (2007). The former is an 
ideal type, which refers to a subcontracting relationship inside the government system, 
representing a hybrid governance structure between bureaucracy in the Weberian (1976) 
sense (a hierarchical system of administrative personnel); and a pure subcontract, which 
occurs among independent entities without bureaucratic, hierarchical relations. This system is 
outcome rather than procedure-oriented, and therefore gives the agent more discretion to do 
things in their own way while letting the principal keep their authority. The latter is an implicit 
competition among local governments for gains in political and economic performance. It 
describes how the vertical bureaucratic relationship between central and local government 
and the horizontal competing relationship between different local governments impact upon 
governing results. He regards both as incentive systems for Chinese local officials - and critical 
sources of China’s future development.  
Allied to this, Cao (2011:1-40) takes issue with Western scholars’ representation of 
China’s political power as a centralized, imposed system. He argues that the actual situation 
is one in which “central government rules officials and local government rules people”. By 
adjusting the centralization and decentralization of power across different tiers of government, 
central government distributes and controls the risks and burdens of ruling. Zhou (2013) points 
out that, historically, the hierarchical nature of rule in Imperial China has parallels with today’s 
multi-level government. According to this argument, the legacy of the formal and informal 
system in old China still has influence today: key components of governance are not 
autonomous - but co-existing and co-dependent to each other. From an international 
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perspective, the flexibility of this hybrid system has made China’s bureaucratic system unique 
and ‘effective’.  
According to the foregoing view, government is understood almost as the sole actor 
for ‘governance’ (here, the connotation of the term is more closely related to ‘ruling’). After the 
rise of ‘new’ governance studies in the West during the 1990s, many Chinese scholars 
embraced some emerging ideas and began to see local governance in a different light. They 
agreed that the essence of governance is to build order in society (Yu, 2000) and focus on 
governing mechanisms. Crucially, these are not necessarily reliant on the resources, authority 
and sanctions of government (Rhodes, 1997; Stoker, 1997). Instead, they are shaped by a 
multiplicity of actors across the state, civil sphere and business. More importantly, they believe 
that local residents should be the subject rather than object in local governance, because 
fulfilling their needs is the priority in a socialist state (Pan, 2004).  
However, scholars have also highlighted how, despite people’s urgent need for 
effective public services, their participation rates in local governance are very low. Some 
believe this is because people still carry the habits formed in the Danwei era planned 
economy; as a result, notions of autonomous society are not well formed (Xu, 1998). In this 
sense, local governance in China is not just about providing public services, but also building 
a society that can make up for the shortcomings of the state and the market (Xia, 2010). Wu 
& Yang (2006) believe the way to resolve such challenges is to have more programmes 
variously led by the government, market forces and/or social organizations, targeted at 
building trust among people and increasing social capital within communities.  
Others think that lack of public awareness of the aims of the governance reforms is the 
fundamental problem for local governance in China. According to this view, helping people 
learn to communicate and negotiate, and step out from their private zones into the public 
arena, is critical for good governance (Li, Xiao & Huang, 2012; Xiao, 2017).  
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There are also scholars who believe that more autonomy and resources should be 
given to the people, so they can govern by themselves (Wu & Zhang, 2016). Although these 
commentators all stress the importance of society, they acknowledge that the role of local 
government is more than necessary in the governing process. This is because it must still 
provide resources and, more importantly, keep the direction of the local development in line 
with the spirit of central government priorities.  
In fact, the difficulty for local government is not just about fulfilling the requirements of 
the upper-level government, nor is it solely about stimulating people to participate in the 
governing process while maintaining stability. Rather, it is about balancing the two and 
carrying out its programmes with limited time, energy and resources. To explore this further, 
after a brief outline of the study methodology, we examine the case of Beijing Xicheng District 
and learn about how local governance is possible by analysing different governmental 
projects. 
 
Methodology 
China’s vast size presents different provincial governments with diverse environments shaped 
by contrasting levels of economic development, as well as local, social or cultural factors. 
Against this backdrop, this article focuses on the case of Beijing province. As the capital of 
China, Beijing not only shoulders the responsibility of being the leading example for China in 
terms of building new governance models, but is also under tremendous pressure to maintain 
socio-economic stability. Xicheng district is in the centre of Beijing and considered a very 
important district. As a result, the local government faces strong pressure to build governance 
while maintaining stability, which gives this case study very high demonstration value.  
As we have noted, this study examines moves towards implementing a new, post-19th 
CPC Central Committee mode of governance from the perspective of local government. From 
May 2017, Xicheng district started a project called the ‘People’s Livelihood and People’s Will 
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Project’ (hereafter referred to as ‘People’s Will Project’). This followed the 19th People’s 
Congress’s call to “meet people’s need and elevate people’s living standards” by listening 
closely to the people’s will.3 As a member of the CASS4 research group, the author went to 
six street agencies (government dispatched offices), in Xicheng district for interviews and to 
undertake participant observation. 21 interviews were conducted; each took approximately 
three hours. Six focus groups were also conducted with local CCP party leaders, government 
officials, community directors, social workers, volunteers and residents. In addition, textual 
analysis was undertaken of a range of political and policy documents, including the ‘People’s 
Will Project’ work plan of the district’s government, and the workflow schedules of different 
street offices. 
 
Research Context 
The People’s Will project did not emerge suddenly. Instead, it developed over a number of 
years. Early in 2012, when the 18th Congress meeting was held, the Xicheng District 
Government was trying to take the lead in local governance innovation. It started a ‘fully 
responsive’ project. It proposed that the government use advanced technological means to 
interact with enterprises and social organizations through information sharing, in order to 
identify and solve residents’ problems in a timely manner (giving residents more ways to 
engage in addressing problems). Compared with the previous top down governing model, this 
project was an important attempt to take consideration of people’s will into account in the 
process. Albeit: people’s opinions were collected after the implementation of government 
projects, and local government was faced with the daunting task of retrospectively resolving 
issues.  
                                                          
3 Report of the 19th National Congress, October 18, 2017. 
4 Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the leading social research institute in China.  
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These actions were innovative at the time and the local government won a national 
prize for ‘Progress in Urban Management’. However, in terms of governing, the actions taken 
were relatively passive. Furthermore, they were reactive rather than proactive: they only 
responded to existing problems rather than taking the initiative to prevent future ones from 
happening. In 2013, Xicheng District Government started another project, ‘Visit-Listen-Solve’, 
shorthand for “visit communities, listen to public opinion, and solve people’s problems”. This 
initiative was more proactive and put more emphasis on local government’s interaction with 
local residents. It won two government innovation awards.  
From 2014 onwards, Xicheng District Government started a wide, routine practice of 
including more people’s will into local governing processes. Yet it was not until 2017 that this 
officially became known as the ‘People’s Will Project’. The cases in this paper were selected 
from 2014-2018. This was a key period, when Xicheng District Government tried to incorporate 
people’s will into the entire process of project execution. This innovative step was considered 
a pioneering action for local government. Many programmes fell under this overarching 
heading. As we shall see, these included: reinforcing buildings to ensure they were earthquake 
resistant; transforming and upgrading people’s convenience stores; constructing community-
based welfare centres for the elderly; resolving issues relating to the ‘mobile population5; 
repairing and maintaining roads and alleyways; managing car parking; installing elevators on 
the outside of older-style apartment buildings; and arranging groups for social, cultural and 
educational activities.  
These diverse programmes required different management methods: a ‘bespoke’ 
approach, which was very time and energy consuming for local government. Besides, while 
some programmes were relatively successful, others encountered many obstacles. Therefore, 
                                                          
5 Also known as ‘migrant worker’, but this term was later considered discriminatory and replaced by 
‘mobile population’. 
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the Xicheng District Government was keen to identify more efficient ways to conduct such 
programmes.  
It categorized the ensuing ones into three types: programmes involving the will of the 
people in a supplementary role (Type 1); programmes involving the will of the people in an 
advisory role (Type 2); and programmes initiated by the will of the people (Type 3), to better 
steer project delivery. Yet the Xicheng District Government itself admits that these are not 
discrete categories and some programmes are hard to classify. In order to provide a full insight 
into the new governance arrangements, the remainder of this article focuses on one case from 
each category. A cross-section was taken to clearly reflect project type.  
 
Case studies 
Type 1: Projects involving the will of the people in a supplementary role 
The first type of programme mainly concerns welfare projects that the government wants to 
carry out, which require people’s understanding and support. The usual procedure is to 
publicize the project, then solicit opinions and suggestions from the residents on the 
established workplan through hearings and public meetings. Based on this process, 
subsequent improvements can then be made; and the project can then be opened to residents 
for inspection. Examples include shanty town renovation and road construction. 
Case 1 Most early projects (circa 2014) based on the will of the people belonged to 
this first category. They were usually managed in a top down way: for example, the 
government-led project to reinforce buildings in older communities and make them earthquake 
resistant. After the 2008 earthquake in Wenchuan, ensuring that buildings were earthquake 
resistant and shockproof was a nationwide priority. In subsequent years, various locales 
began housing reinforcement projects. Many old communities in Beijing needed 
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comprehensive renovation. The municipal government believed that the best way to realize 
project goals was for it to take the lead, and for the residents to cooperate with this.   
 
At the beginning of this project, the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development 
required local authorities to conduct a general survey of buildings and reinforce those that did 
not meet the standards for earthquake resistant housing. After the project was finalized, the 
government initially determined three reinforcement methods: external, internal and double-
panel wall reinforcement. Each have their advantages and disadvantages. External 
reinforcement does not take up much interior space of the home and has less impact on 
residents; but it has a greater impact on the façade of the building, so that the effect of 
consolidation may be less effective. Internal reinforcement does not change the façade of the 
building, but does decrease living space. If the original wall is not strong enough to resist 
earthquakes, the internal reinforcement method is better. But in the residents’ view, it was less 
welcome: because of the consequent loss of living space in their houses. The double-panel 
wall reinforcement method reinforces the building from both the inside and the outside. This 
approach has the best consolidating effect - but is problematic, as it also takes up living space.  
 
From the perspective of the local government, the most effective way to implement the 
programme is to hire professionals, let them design the reinforcement plan, then ask the 
residents to cooperate. This was the government’s plan. However, when the programme was 
conducted, many problems emerged. While most residents considered the reinforcement 
programme to be beneficial, some had concerns. For example, some disliked having to leave 
their home during the construction work; not least because finding alternative accommodation 
was costly. Others wanted to choose the reinforcement plan themselves. They stressed that 
the internal and double-panel reinforcement method would shrink their living space; and 
consequently, affect the rental charges they could command and the value of their property.  
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Apart from dissatisfaction with the project itself, a small number of residents used their 
refusal to cooperate as leverage to force the government to resolve other problems, such as 
drainage issues. In other cases, they opposed the plan because of conflicts with neighbours. 
In such instances, they wanted the government to take their side. Although neighbourly 
disputes should not be the government’s responsibility, some residents were still accustomed 
to relying on it to solve problems, as in the Danwei era. Therefore, during the project’s 
operational stages, government personnel received many letters of complaint on a range of 
matters, not all directly related to the task at hand.  
 
Reinforcing buildings so they are earthquake resistant is not just a city-wide 
requirement, but a nationwide one. Thus, the top down pressure on Xicheng district from 
central government was great. As a result, despite some people’s resistance, the local 
government adopted a tough attitude and pushed through the project. However, it did take 
some residents’ opinions into consideration, and even offered financial compensation to help 
displaced families with alternative accommodation costs during the construction period. In the 
end, the work was finished, but the implementation process was difficult and caused a lot of 
dissatisfaction among the residents.  
  
According to Xicheng district’s Major Construction Projects Headquarters, although 
many Type One projects were completely implemented, they did not ease people’s concerns 
- and some caused public disquiet. Even though the government has invested a lot of money, 
it is difficult to get residents to agree to such projects, and the results have not been ideal. 
Therefore, some projects that are not of highest priority for the national government are 
developed as involving the will of the people in an advisory role (Type two). 
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Type 2: Projects involving the will of the people in an advisory role 
The second type of project mainly refers to those which the residents want done and the 
government is able to facilitate, but the local authority’s mode of working determines that a 
certain percentage of residents must agree before implementation can take place. The usual 
procedure is for the government to announce the project, before local people apply to 
participate in it. In the following discussion, this kind of project is represented by a scheme to 
install elevators on the outside of old buildings. 
 
Case 2 In recent years, the problem of an ageing population in China has become 
more and more prominent. The buildings in many old residential areas do not have elevators, 
and it is difficult for elderly people to use the stairs. Therefore, the demand to install elevators 
has gradually become louder. Since the ageing problem is a major policy priority for central 
government, local government is incentivized to act. However, people living on different floors 
have very different requests. This made it very hard for local government to implement the 
programme. Therefore, the Xicheng District Government piloted the programme in several 
communities where elevators are needed.   
 
The buildings in residential area X6 were built in the 1950s and 1960s, without 
elevators. Most residents in this community are elderly, so there is greater demand for 
installing elevators. Since 2012, community residents have repeatedly reported this need. At 
the same time, the government has gradually been paying greater attention to older people’s 
issues. The project was announced by the Xicheng District Government, which determined 
the conditions and procedures for applying. Subsequently, street-level and community 
administrators collected residents’ ideas on the proposed elevator installation.  
 
                                                          
6 The name of the area is coded to protect residents’ privacy. 
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Before the project began, the Xicheng District Housing Management Bureau held 
some Q&A sessions based on the original survey of local peoples’ concerns. Initially, the 
government was unable to fully answer people’s questions and dispel their misgivings (such 
as the cost of running the project, how to maintain the elevators, and there would be extra 
noise). However, as a result of the Q&A sessions, the Xicheng District Government gained 
greater understanding of the will of the people.  
After this, in order to dispel residents’ doubts, street-level officers and the 
Neighbourhood Committee conducted three visits to the 62 danyuan7 of the 11 buildings in 
the community and collected residents’ opinions. During the first visit, they held a meeting 
attended by volunteers who oversaw communication among residents in each building and 
arranged the installation of elevators. The data showed that the overall support rate in favour 
of installing elevators was 87 per cent. The biggest difference in approval rates was between 
ground floor residents and those residents on higher floors. This was because many elderly 
residents in high-rise buildings have difficulty using the stairs, so their demand for elevators 
was very strong. However, many ground floor residents fear that installing elevators will 
increase noise and block out light; and may also lower the value of their apartment or reduce 
the rental price it can command.  
 
The second visit was conducted by Xicheng District Housing Authority. It interviewed 
935 households using a questionnaire survey, and answered any concerns the residents had 
about the costs of installing the elevators. This assured them that this was a pilot project and 
they did not have to worry about the installation fee. They were also told that the elevator 
maintenance fees would be based on square metres of residents’ property size, except the 
first floor. After the reassurances given by officials during this visit, the supporting rate rose to 
92 per cent.  
 
                                                          
7 Living unit. There are usually three-five danyuan in each building. 
26 
 
During the third visit, the staff conducted a questionnaire survey on whether it would 
be appropriate to charge one Yuan per square metre for the elevator’s electricity supply and 
maintenance fee. Following this, residents’ approval rate dropped to only 51.2 per cent. The 
People’s Republic of China’s Property Rights Law stipulates that generally, only if two-thirds 
of residents are in favour of a project can it be carried out. However, in the case of installing 
elevators on the outside of older residential buildings, as noted, the opinions of ground floor 
residents were different to those of residents on the upper floors. The proportion of ground 
floor residents compared with the entire population is relatively small; so, the government has 
stipulated that the approval rate for elevator installation projects must be 100 per cent.  
 
As the residents had quite a few concerns and the will of the people was constantly 
changing, only the residents of number 5, 7 and 9 danyuan reached a consensus. A large part 
of the reason for this was that the ground floor of each of these three danyuan was a shop, 
rather than a residence. In addition, the volunteers who oversee communication among the 
residents were very proactive, and continually worked to change the minds of the residents 
and build consensus. Within these three danyuan, each floor has four households: so, a 
danyuan with five floors has 20 households, and the three danyuan together have a total of 
60 households. Residents signed two agreements: one indicating they were willing to install 
the elevator; the other, to pay its operational costs. After both agreements were signed, the 
project was successfully launched, and the local government took the lead in contracting a 
company to implement the project.  
 
Compared with Type One (above), this Type Two project took people’s will into 
consideration at a relatively early stage. During the process, the government constantly 
communicated with the people, adjusting the plan based on residents’ opinions. Volunteers 
played a key role, mediating between residents and local government. These volunteers 
mainly came from top floors of the residential building and had a strong incentive to install the 
elevators. A Type Two project gave them more room to act. People were generally happy with 
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the programme; but from a local government perspective, it was resource- intensive, and 
would be expensive to roll out to other areas beyond the pilot.  
Type 3: Projects initiated by the will of the people  
The third type of project has the highest participation rate among the People’s Will Projects. 
This type mainly refers to projects that residents want to see implemented; but are not in the 
local government’s existing programme of work. In such cases, the government first listens 
to the people’s needs and wants; then lets residents discuss a practical scheme for 
implementation. The government then provides support to realize these projects. 
Case 3. With the improvement of peoples’ living standards, the number of private cars 
in urban communities is increasing, resulting in increasingly limited availability of parking 
spaces. Older style urban planning cannot meet new demands of urban residents, and parking 
problems are a serious issue for local communities.  
 
The hutong in our third case study is an alley of one-storey buildings with more 
prosperous streets on both sides. In consequence, many vehicles pass through it, and many 
people park their cars in it. However, because of lack of management, car parking is very 
disorderly. Residents have installed many ground locks8 to safeguard a parking space. Not 
only does this not solve the parking problem; it also causes conflict among residents.  
 
Originally, this issue did not attract the government’s attention. However, when the 
hutong environment started to deteriorate, the Xicheng District Government felt obliged to 
intervene. In order to avoid resident coercion as in Type One projects, the street-level 
government, together with community Neighbourhood Committees, organized several hutong 
‘salons’ and let residents discuss their biggest concerns. Foremost was the parking problem 
                                                          
8 Physical devices to control access to a parking space. 
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in the hutong. By letting people set out their own viewpoints and needs, local government 
significantly enhanced people’s enthusiasm about the programme.  
 
After this, the community held a second salon for both car and non-car owners to voice 
their opinions, discuss the reasons for parking problems and enable both sides to understand 
the other’s position. This process lasted for about a month. According to staff, it was to allow 
the residents a “venting period”. After that, people’s emotions gradually subsided, and the 
discussion entered its second stage. At this point, residents became more rational and 
gradually began to understand that they themselves, not government, had a responsibility to 
rectify the parking problem. In short, there was a shift from ‘emotional venting’ to rational 
thinking.  
 
The third salon brought the discussion to the solution stage. This involved residents 
electing representatives who were articulate and likely to actively participate in the discussion 
of parking solutions and protocols. Staff of the Neighbourhood Committee reported that the 
atmosphere during this phase was both amiable and rational. As residents' discussions 
advanced, the role of street-level governments and communities gradually changed from 
controller, to organizer, then to supervisor. It was entirely up to the residents themselves to 
decide on parking charges and how to balance the relationship between the various groups in 
the negotiations. As the government was not directly participating in a top down manner, 
residents were highly motivated and demonstrated a sense of responsibility for both organizing 
and supervising operations.  
 
After the draft of the residents’ protocol on addressing the parking problem came out, 
the Neighbourhood Committee mobilized residents to vote on it in accordance with the 
relevant provisions of The Law of the Urban Residential Committees in the People’s Republic 
of China. In order to increase the legitimacy of the decision-making process, the 
Neighbourhood Committee gave notice of the upcoming vote to all residents aged 18 or over 
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in the community. One person was chosen from each household as a representative; and 
seven residents were chosen from the community as the hutong management committee. 
They were placed in charge of implementation of the program. The traffic management bureau 
and the region’s danweis were also very cooperative and sent representatives to the meeting.  
 
In the end, avoiding parking at peak times and having different parking areas for 
different types of vehicles has, to a large extent, greatly alleviated the parking problems. At 
the same time, the ground locks privately installed by the residents were forcibly removed. 
These measures have helped greatly to improve the community environment; and during the 
consultation process, residents have also gained deeper mutual understanding of local 
problem-solving and co-working.  
 
Discussion  
As the foregoing sections attest to, when lower tiers of government launch a project, they often 
face pressure to align their actions with - and realize the policy goals of - higher levels of 
central government. This is especially true of Beijing’s Xicheng District Government: it is 
situated in the capital, near the Central Government, making oversight easier, but also 
requiring a ‘demonstration effect’. When they formulate projects that are beneficial to the 
people, the starting point for the Central Government or the Beijing Municipal Government is 
usually to consider development at the national level and city-wide level.  
In Seeing Like a State, Scott (1998) holds that, when implementing a project, the state 
usually adopts a scientific, modern, economic approach to the process of governance. It 
considers development from an overall or holistic perspective. However, such approaches 
often conflict with the specific needs of a given locale, leading to the failure of many local 
development projects. Scott's explanation resonates with the findings of this study, for it 
underlines the tension between people’s will from the perspective of the state and the will of 
30 
 
residents of a given locality. In practice, this discussion has shown how Xicheng District 
Government is aware of this and, in response, tries to bridge the gap in different projects by 
treating them with different approaches, such as the Type 1-3 interventions discussed above.  
On the face of it, what differentiates the governance style adopted by the authorities, 
is the degree of local public involvement in the project. From Type One to Type Three projects, 
the degree of peoples’ engagement increases. In the first type, the intervention is in line with 
the government's pre-existing policy programme. In this mode, the will of the people is 
basically only involved at the level of offering advice and supervision. In Type Two projects, 
social policy interventions are also largely part of the government's pre-existing programme. 
In contrast, in Type Three projects, whilst they might potentially be part of the government's 
plan, it is the residents who take the initiative and propose the project, before the government 
decides whether to carry it out.  
 
Viewed from a deeper angle, the classification proposed in this study (Type 1-3 
projects) is not only determined by the level of people’s participation, but also by the urgency 
and ‘rigidity’ of the programme in the eyes of the government. From the first to the third type, 
the rigidity (or prescriptive nature) of each programme decreased. The first type is assigned 
from the top down, and its requirements are pre-specified, so that local government has to 
follow the instructions of central or municipal government. In the second type, the proposed 
intervention is also on the central government’s agenda, but the timeframe and mode of 
implementation is relatively flexible. In the third type, the underlying issues are not originally 
the concern of central government, but local government is still under pressure to ensure good 
governance and actively solve people’s problems.  
 
During the implementation process, local government faces most pressure from 
superior tiers of government in Type One projects. Therefore, in such instances, effectively 
the will of the people is silenced. As stated in the discussion of Case One, the government 
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asked experts to evaluate and find suitable reinforcement schemes; but when it came to 
different groups and individual residents, their demands were different to the views of the 
experts and officials. For example, some groups and individuals felt that the reinforcement 
method negatively impacted on their living space, especially those residents with smaller 
apartments. During the implementation process, different residents may have compared 
viewpoints. Moreover, they may have held inconsistent opinions about the merits, fairness and 
disadvantages of a given reinforcement method. However, due to the rigidity of the Type One 
mode of governance and mode of project implementation, residents’ views and wishes were 
sidelined. 
 
Overall, although the reinforcement of old buildings is beneficial to residents, the 
benefits to different groups and individuals may vary greatly. In order to maintain social stability 
and ease people’s dissatisfaction, this study shows how local government used monetary 
compensation as a solution to override community concerns and resistance to its 
programmes. Whilst this expedient approach might be helpful in pushing the project forward, 
arguably, it is neither helpful in making local people feel satisfied, nor consistent with the spirit 
of the 18th and 19th CPC Central Committee reforms, which underlined the need to enhance 
the participation of civil society. 
 
Compared with the first type of project, the second fosters wider and deeper levels of 
citizen engagement. As can be seen from the case study provided in this article, the Xicheng 
District Government’s planned installation of elevators in some old communities was one way 
of addressing the needs of an ageing population. Many residents in the community also 
expressed an urgent desire for the installation of elevators. The district government still faced 
top down pressure to both alleviate social conflicts and respond to the central government’s 
requirement for participatory governance. Here, the Type Two project solicited the will of the 
people both after its launch and before its implementation.  
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From the perspective of the participation mechanism of the will of the people, residents’ 
participation in the second type of project is freer than in the first type. Collecting the will of the 
people is still dominated by a top down approach, yet the level of community participation has 
apparently increased. Notably, this was accompanied by a broadening of engagement 
mechanisms, such as focus groups, surveys and public meetings. People’s will in this case is 
very diverse, and communication between residents was not achieved by them themselves, 
but through the mediation of the Xicheng District Government, street-level offices and the 
Neighbourhood Committee.    
 
During the government’s visits, residents’ concerns could be addressed. If they were 
not satisfied, they could choose not to participate, which gave them a greater degree of 
freedom than the first type of project. However, the space for the people to express their will 
in such projects is still limited. Compared with the first category, the will of the people was no 
longer completely fragmented, yet disagreements and dissent remained. The government 
ultimately carried out the project, but not until after the residents reached a rational and 
unanimous decision. Rather, it was aided by the government using subsidies to solve the 
disagreement among residents. In this way, the grassroots government has completed the 
tasks asked of it by the higher-level government; and at the same time, to a certain extent, 
has met the needs of the residents, reducing disagreement between the government and 
society. However, it is important to note that this was a pilot project and it could take special 
measures. Specifically, it could obtain greater resources. Excessive cost and resource factors 
mean it is unlikely to be rolled out and implemented in other communities.  
 
The third type of project is where the residents themselves set up specific projects, 
rather than the government. With Type Three projects, the district government is not directly 
faced with the specific projects assigned by higher levels of government. Instead, it is faced 
with the task of completing residents’ welfare projects based on the issues they feel need 
addressing. In accordance with the concept of multi-governance, while also responding to the 
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wishes of local communities, in this type of programme, the district government allows the 
residents themselves to decide what projects will be developed by setting up negotiation 
platforms.  
 
Ironically, although residents had many demands, they finally settled on the parking 
management project, which was not an arbitrary choice. There are two main reasons for this. 
First, the parking problem has indeed affected the lives of many residents, resulting in a 
deterioration of the community’s surrounding environment: so they had a strong desire to 
rectify the problem. Second, the parking problem violates the city’s overall plan, affecting the 
image of the capital; rectifying this is in line with central government policy. Therefore, the staff 
of the street-level government and Neighbourhood Committee intentionally directed the will of 
the people towards this.  
 
The Neighbourhood Committee provided residents with a platform to discuss actual 
problems and allow different groups to express their opinions. In this way, the residents 
gradually developed from venting their emotions to a more rational, solution-orientated 
discussion. This allowed various solutions to be identified. Although different groups and 
individuals have contrasting opinions, people were finally able to understand each other's 
viewpoints and, through discussing them, find solutions. The problems of individual parking 
spaces and effective use of public space, were both rectified. In the end, residents came to a 
unified agreement.  
 
Compared with the case study about installing elevators, the strategy for resolving 
parking problems did not have an unfair impact on certain groups or individuals. Instead, by 
establishing a set of regulations, the interests of different groups and individuals were 
balanced. Ultimately, the community’s parking problems were solved.  
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In social theory terms, the three project types can be conceptualized with reference to 
empowerment theory (Himmelman, 1996). Broadly, Types One and Two are examples of 
‘collaborative betterment’ – whereby government pays a dominant role in project choice and 
implementation, with communities then asked to acquiesce after most major decisions have 
been taken. In contrast, Type Three projects might broadly be characterized by what 
Himmelman terms ‘collaborative empowerment’. As the name suggests, in this mode of 
governance, citizens are empowered to set the agenda to an extent and play a more 
thoroughgoing role in determining the means by which projects are implemented. That said, it 
remains the case that government is a veto player and retains ultimate authority. 
 
Conclusion 
From the perspective of grassroots participation in government, this paper has explored three 
approaches to local governance in today’s China. When discussing the difficulties of local 
governance, previous academic research has largely focused on exogenous interests’ vertical 
or horizontal relationships within the government, or how autonomy can form within local 
society. Crucially, these works tend to undermine the importance of local government during 
this process. In contrast, this study has discussed how local government faces the challenge 
of simultaneously balancing the requirements of central government and the demands of local 
communities.  
 
While central government and CCP is the representative of the people, their view is 
more focused on the national level; this may diverge from the people’s will at a local level. By 
contrasting three case studies in Beijing Xicheng district, this paper provides a different 
perspective to understanding local governance. Our findings can be summarized as follows. 
 
First, although the central Chinese state wants to build a new governance model in 
which there will be many different elements contributing to the contemporary process of 
governing, central government will always retain supreme authority. As can be seen from our 
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three case studies, no matter which type of project it is, local government is always present. 
In the first type, it dominates the project; in the second type, it leads the project; in the third, it 
fine tunes the project. In all three scenarios, people have the freedom to choose their own 
projects, so long as they align with the agenda of the central government. Otherwise, it is hard 
for local government to give it serious attention. What the local government actually does is 
translate people’s needs into the central government’s plan, before obtaining resources to 
solve the community’s problems.  
 
Second, with the advancement of the role of local government in the wake of the 18th 
and 19th CPC Central Committees, not only does the people’s will play a more and more 
important role in local governance, but it also influences implementation of the programmes 
at an earlier stage. For example, people get more room to express their concerns and 
dissatisfaction before the project commences. Moreover, they have a right to veto the project 
if it greatly compromises their interests. In Type Three projects, people even have freedom to 
choose their own ways of solving the problems. For local government, giving people this 
degree of freedom not only alleviates some of its burdens; but is also good for reducing the 
level of people’s complaints and maintaining social stability.  
 
Last but not least, the degree of freedom that the local government gives to people 
under Type Three projects is not unbounded. It falls within certain parameters. Here, past 
experience tells local government that too much community involvement would cause 
unlimited responsibilities falling on its shoulders. Therefore, a key consideration when deciding 
which of the three different project types to implement is where to draw the line between the 
state’s responsibilities and those of local communities. Indeed, as the foregoing case studies 
reveal, to understand the dynamic of contemporary governance in today’s China, the drive for 
reform should not solely be seen as lying exclusively within the central government’s strategic 
agenda, nor in society, but also in the ‘translational’ actions of local government officials. 
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In other words, this paper shows that central government reform, when implemented 
through the multi-level governance system, involves considerable demands on local 
government to find innovative and effective ways to address central government demands. 
Our findings also reveal the tension between the rhetoric of participation and pressure for 
successful project delivery by local government. Despite rhetoric to the contrary, this may lead 
local government to resort to top down tools, such as monetary compensation with which to 
obviate citizen opposition to reform.  
 
Overall, local governance is an ongoing task explored by officials and scholars alike. 
Given that across China, different local governments in each province face different 
institutional environments, cultural histories and social relations, they may have to come up 
with different strategies. However, this case study has revealed one possible way of bridging 
the gap between people’s needs and the central government’s priorities. It has also offered a 
new perspective through which to understand grassroots governance in China. 
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2. State-Made Society? Exploring the ‘creation of society’ and the provision of public 
services at the community level in contemporary China  
 
Shi Yuntong 
 
Abstract: Residents’ self-organization in urban communities has been considered a 
promising path for the creation of society in China; a setting where, hitherto, some 
researchers believed that society did not exist. But in recent years, the supply-side reforms 
carried out by local government, notably in provisions of public service in urban 
communities, seems to have opened up a new path for the creation of society. Analysing the 
concept, motivations, tactics and effects of state-made society, this article points out that 
although producing society is an unintended consequence, it has resulted in the mutual 
empowerment of both state and society. However, as the following discussion reveals, the 
external empowerment of society by the state does not always lead to the internal 
empowerment of the former. Instead, it sometimes deepens its dependency on the state, 
attenuates social fragmentation and strengthens state domination. It is argued that only 
through full empowerment can state-made society work effectively. 
 
Introduction and methodology 
‘How to create a society in China?’ is a question which Chinese scholars have been 
discussing and trying to answer since the 1990s (Deng & Jing, 1992; Kang, 1999; Yan, 
1999; Gu, 2004; Xu, 2006; and Shen 2007a). After 2000, the government has placed 
increasing emphasis on the development of society. Notably, in recent years, the ‘supply-
side reforms’ carried out by local government in provision of public services in urban 
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communities seems to have opened up a new path for the creation of society. This “creating 
society with the help of the state” is called ‘state-made society’ in the following discussion. 
Specifically, attention will be given to the dynamics involved in this new phenomenon; and 
we shall attempt to answer “whether society could be created by the state”.  
In terms of structure, this paper begins by reviewing the literature on state-society 
relations (Section 1). It then summarizes two routes to the creation of society in China 
(Section 2). After that, we examine the driving forces of ‘state-made society’ and explore the 
routes to actualizing it (Section 3), before investigating what kind of impact this process has 
on both government and society (Section 4). This paper offers a theoretical perspective on 
the ‘creation of society’ from being ‘self-organized’ to ‘government-organized’. Further, it 
assesses whether it is possible to create a real society in China by means of state 
intervention (Section 5). 
The author has been paying attention to grassroots social governance and services 
in China for several years. This paper’s analysis of ‘government-made society’ is based on 
fieldwork data gathered from semi-structured face-to-face focus group interviews in B, C & Z 
cities in China during 2015-2016 (anonymized to protect participant confidentiality). City B is 
in northern China; City C is in south-west, inland China; while City Z is on the southern 
coastline.  
This case selection provides good geographical coverage of the People’s Republic. 
Despite their different locations, they have something in common. First, they are all first-tier 
cities, with developed economies and enjoying social progress. At the same time, they are 
all among the few cities which have carried out supply-side reform in provision of public 
services in urban communities in recent years. Thus, they have key commonalities allowing 
for comparative analysis. City Z, H district, W community was selected as the main case 
study because it was once seen as a pioneer community. Yet over recent years, observers 
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have concluded that it has largely failed in its endeavours; making it an interesting case for 
in-depth analysis. 
The research interviews were carried out by the author and project members and 
lasted approximately 1-2 hours each. They were based on an interview schedule consisting 
of the same core questions and different additional questions designed according to the 
actual situation of each city. Data gathering and analysis strictly abided by established 
academic ethics such as upholding participant anonymity and confidentiality, increasing the 
reliability of data. The 60 interviewees included members from local government 
departments, street offices, and community party committees, residents’ committees, 
councils, social organizations and residents. Considering the advantages and disadvantages 
of different data collection methods, other forms, such as participant observation, 
video/photography, policy text and media report collection were also used to boost data 
validity during our fieldwork investigation. This holistic approach makes it easier to present 
more comprehensive analysis of the new social phenomenon of ‘state-made society’. 
 
Section 1: ‘Mutually Antagonistic’ or ‘Mutually Beneficial’: Revisiting the relationship 
between state and society 
Sociologists in both China and the West have focused attention on the relationship between 
state and society. In the following discussion, following a review of Aristotle’s Poetics, and 
some of the works of Cicero, Hegel and Marx, attention is turned to the work of Antonio 
Gramsci: with its focus on hegemony, guilds, trade associations, educational and voluntary 
organizations, and benefit/interest groups, Consideration is also given to Karl Polanyi’s work, 
with its focus on active society, labour unions, and cooperatives (Burawoy, 2003, 2007).  
In the West, state and society are often viewed as two separate entities, with mutual 
checks and balances. From the 1990s onwards, academics began to gradually re-think 
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‘state-society’ relations, and the idea that they are two separate, oppositional entities, while 
also highlighting the possibility of mutual empowering relations between them (Gu, 2004). In 
this regard, Huang (1993) cogently points out that simply saying that the state and society 
are mutually antagonistic is an abstraction from the early stages of Western political, 
economic and social development; and cannot be uncritically applied for use in analysing the 
current state of affairs in China. Instead, Huang proposes the concept of ‘the third-space’ in 
analysing state-society relations.  
Migdal proposes the idea of state-in-society instead of state versus society. He 
rejects the idea that state and society are in opposition to one another (that they are in a 
zero-sum game), and that there are rigid boundaries between the two. He says they can 
enjoy mutual transformation and empowerment (Migdal, 1988, 2001; Migdal et al., 1994). 
Citing the work of Ostrom on ‘coproduction’ (1996) and Evans on ‘state-society synergy’ 
(1997), he argued that Western theories of state-society relations have moved from a 
position of mutual antagonism to mutual cooperation. 
In China, though, following the polarization of state and society pre-1979, prevailing 
thought began to change regarding the belief that society was best developed through top 
down, hierarchical control by the state; and that society, in turn, was a passive recipient (Liu, 
2009). 
Section 2: ‘Self-Organization’ or ‘State-Organization’? Two routes to the creation of 
society in China 
In practice, China’s ‘state-society’ relationship has developed along a path from “total state 
control” to “gradual release” (Shen, 2007b) to “active advancement of society”. In this 
process, both sides constantly adjust, modify and remodel the prevailing mode of 
cooperation, as well as the boundary of rights and responsibilities. Both sides also influence 
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the operation of the wider governance system, with its institutional mechanisms and social 
processes.  
The first manifestations of the ‘creation of society’ and two paths to its realization 
When the People’s Republic of China was founded in 1949, it formed a highly integrated 
structure of political, economic and social unity, a “total society” (Sun, 1994). The state had 
centralized the various political, economic and social resources and had a high degree of top 
down control. Unplanned economic activities and autonomous social activities were rarely 
seen. After economic reform and ‘Opening-Up’ in the post-1978 period, economic activities 
were gradually released from total state control, and market principles emerged in the 
Chinese economy. After 2000, the development of society was gradually given the same 
status as political, economic and cultural development. To this end, central government has 
put forward a series of objectives to promote the development of society, as part of its 
Central Policy. For example, the Fourth Plenary Session of the 16th CPC Central Committee 
proposed ‘Advancing Innovation in the Social Management System’ as an important factor in 
the Party’s ability to govern. In similar vein, the report of the 17th Party Congress outlined the 
need to “accelerate the development of society, with an emphasis on improving peoples’ 
livelihoods”; improve “the leadership of the Party Committee, government responsibility, 
social cohesion and public participation in the social management system”; and “maximize 
social innovation”. The subsequent report of the 18th Party Congress stressed the 
importance of “strengthen[ing] the development of society by improving peoples’ livelihoods 
and by innovations in social management”; “guid[ing] the healthy and orderly development of 
social organizations”; and “encouraging the masses to take a fundamental role in social 
management”.  
Several factors can account for these developments. First: government’s desire to 
reorganize ‘atomized’ individuals into a cohesive society in order to maintain social stability. 
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In the past, urban society was organized and controlled through the Danwei system:9 almost 
everyone was in a Danwei. They could only get their resources, welfare and services from 
the Danwei. Due to resource dependency, they were fully controlled by the state. After China 
carried out its reforms and Opening-Up in 1978, people could get a job in both public and 
non-public economies. To a certain extent, that meant the state could not control everyone 
from the old Danwei system. With its demise, the only place for the state to find and organise 
everyone was in their dwelling communities. So by 2000, the notion of community building 
(and the development of society) was promoted by central government. 
Second, promotion of the development of society was motivated by the desire to 
release the administrative burden on government. Chinese government has for a long time 
been top down - contrasting with China’s passive society. People used to think that it was 
the government’s responsibility to solve their problems and meet their diverse needs. A form 
of state dependency gained hold in the planned economy era. In recent years, to counter 
this, the state began to encourage the people to be more responsible in social management; 
in short, more self-sufficient. In consequence, community residents are encouraged to be 
more self-organized, self-managed, self-serviced, self-educated and rely less on the 
government. This is also seen as updating the prevailing governance system from below (by 
enhancing social vitality). 
Third, it was motivated by the wish for greater professionalism (for professionals do 
professional things). This objective is closely related to ‘guid[ing] the healthy and orderly 
development of social organizations’ in the Central Committee’s discourse. In the past, 
people received a variety of services from the Danwei system. But with its decline, 
government has given a portion of the responsibility for community service to the Community 
Residents’ Committees (CRC). On the one hand, the NRC cannot mobilize adequate 
                                                          
9 A danwei, or work unit, constituted a form of social organization in Maoist China. It followed the 
principle of organizing workplaces and housing as spatial units. Each was assigned to a unit that 
would provide for their work, social, and cultural needs. 
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resources to do the community service work; while on the other, they are not professional 
enough to deliver the required services. Thus, the state is promoting the healthy and orderly 
development of social organizations to undertake government procurement services which 
cannot be adequately and smoothly provided by the CRCs. 
A fourth aspect to note here is the existence of risks. To a degree, the state is 
worried about the risk of encouraging the creation of society. So on the one hand, it prefers 
to encourage the development of social organizations with little risk of instability (such as 
community service organizations, scientific and high tech organizations, trade unions and 
charities), and restrict the development of what are viewed as risky social organizations (e.g. 
rights-based organizations). The latter is called “the System of Differential Controls” (Kang & 
Han, 2005).  
As Xi Jinping noted at the 19th National Congress of the CPC, “we will strengthen 
public participation and rule of law in social governance and make such governance smarter 
and more specialized. We will improve mechanisms for preventing and defusing social 
tensions, and properly handle problems among the people”. However, as Shen (2007a) has 
discussed, practical, normative goals and tasks are quite different in a country that has 
already built a market economy, than they are somewhere in the process of building one. 
The task of the former is to revive and strengthen the mechanisms of society and resist the 
dual invasion of markets and power: which is to say, its task is to ‘defend society’. The task 
of the latter is to face new historical conditions, reconstruct or create social norms and 
systems, which means ‘to create society’. In other words, although China has already 
entered a period of great social development, the primary problems facing social 
development are still the questions of “Where does society come from?” and “how can we 
create society?”  
In general, in reviewing China’s recent political transformations, economic reforms, 
and social changes, we can see there are two main routes to ‘social creation’. The first, 
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which the academic community has discussed more fully, has given greater accord and 
respect, and consequently has placed greater expectations in, is the ‘自组织’ i.e., the ‘self-
organization’ route to social creation. This means that society arises spontaneously or 
organically (Xia, 2003; Chen & Li, 2003; Shen, 2007b; Li, 2007; Wang, 2009; Sun et al., 
2016). The second route, ‘他组织’, translated in this paper as ‘government-organized social 
creation’, is where the local government (or other entities) act as an external enabling agent, 
helping to make and organize society in China. The latter, ‘他组织’, is a relatively new social 
phenomenon, which academics have yet to subject to enough in-depth analysis. This paper 
focuses its attention on this.   
 
‘Organizational and Operational Difficulties’: The challenges of self-organized social 
creation 
This section begins by reviewing the self-organized path of social creation. In the early 
1990s, the Ministry of Civil Affairs proposed the idea of ‘Community Building’: in order, on 
the one hand, to better meet the day-to-day requirements of urban residents; and on the 
other, to strengthen urban grassroots political power and management. Gradually, the 
‘community’ not only replaced the danwei (‘work unit’) and became the basic management 
unit of urban space, but also became an important starting point for social development. 
Especially after 2000, with the state’s gradual change of role in relation to society, it became 
more of an enabling state. Researchers thought that the self-organization of residents from 
urban communities might become one of the paths to social creation (or the creation of 
society).  
However, in practice, the state’s slow institutional devolution has, to date, not 
resulted in a qualitative leap in social creation in urban communities. In reality, community 
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residents’ self-organizations still face problems at both the organizational and the operational 
levels. At the former, Community Residents’ Committees, Community House-Owners’ 
Committees and a variety of Community Interest Organizations are the three types of 
organizations upon which urban community ‘social creation’ depends. However, these 
Committees have long been viewed as an extension of government administration at the 
grassroots level.  
In recent years, in order to alleviate the excessive administrative burden of 
Community Residents’ Committees, enhance their ability to serve their residents, and 
restore the autonomy of the latter, various regions have established community workstations 
and service centres, as well as implemented institutional and structural reform at both the 
street and community level, all with apparent beneficial effects (as claimed by local 
governments). Yet sometimes, these measures may also deepen the degree of 
marginalization of Community Residents’ Committees (Zhang & Wang, 2016), reducing their 
community involvement, and further strengthening the state’s penetration into grassroots 
society.  
At the same time, urban Community House-Owners’ Committees are currently facing 
problems caused by their own executive decisions, giving rise to factional politics (Shi, 
2010).10 Besides, there are high organizational costs, lack of decentralization and full 
supervision, insufficient motivation to move towards autonomy, and other issues. In recent 
years, a large number of community recreational organizations have sprung up, many of 
which still only provide entertainment clubs or organizations. They do not, as hoped, function 
as community governance organizations (Li et al., 2012). Only a few have changed from 
small ‘mutual benefit organizations’ into ‘public welfare organizations’ for the benefit of the 
                                                          
10 it is difficult to legally register because the formal requirements to do so are high and there are 
many restrictions. 
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wider community. This points to the reality that residents’ self-organization will not 
necessarily stimulate ‘public spiritedness’.  
At the operational level, there has long been a low participation rate among urban 
community residents (in breadth, depth and frequency) and ineffective participation 
(prompted more frequently by traditional ‘command’ administration and less frequently 
stemming from community residents’ spontaneous initiatives). The level of participation is 
only on the lower rungs of Sherry Arnstein’s theory of the different levels of citizen 
participation, outlined in her seminal ‘The Ladder of Citizen Participation’ (Arnstein, 1969). 
Again, there is an imbalance amongst the population of those who do participate (here, older 
groups and the traditional community elite are in the majority). At the same time, our 
interview data tells us there is a lack of early intervention in community affairs, lack of 
interaction between the multiple stakeholders, and a dearth of collaborative decision-making 
within the community.  
So far, there has been no clear indication that the self-organization of urban 
community residents has led to the creation of a society independent of the state and the 
market, with a high degree of autonomy and public spiritedness (‘公共性’), unlike what was 
expected/predicted by the academic community and desired by the 16th and 18th Committee 
reforms. This is to say, using the self-organization of urban community residents to promote 
the creation of society is still a relatively fragile, challenging process. 
From ‘A Slow Retreat’ to ‘Positive Enablement’: Government-organized social 
creation 
If we now switch focus and view the source of social creation (‘creating society’) from 
‘society’ to the ‘state’, it is not difficult to find that in recent years, in the sphere of urban 
community public service, the ‘state-society’ relationship has been changing from “gradual 
release [of state control]” to “promoting [community] initiative”. This shift can be 
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characterized as a move from ‘slow retreat’ to ‘active promotion’. Some cities’ local 
governments are exploring their own administrative power to promote the participation of 
urban community residents in the supply of public services, thereby optimizing the 
mechanism, structure and efficiency of community public services. This is called ‘supply side 
reform’. As Gu (2004) points out, in the development process of ‘state-society’ relations, the 
state withdrew from some areas and gave them more space and freedom to self-organize 
and self-govern. Although this is significant, it does not mean a blind withdrawal by the state. 
It still operates under the guiding principle of ‘mutual empowerment’, and still plays the role 
of ‘the enabling state’ (Gilbert & Gilbert, 1989; Peng, 2006) in promoting social development. 
Crucially, it retains ultimate power. 
 
Section 3: Localized practices of state-made society  
In recent years, we have seen more and more innovations in the way some cities’ local 
governments have offered community public services. For example, local governments set 
up community public service funds to encourage and help establish community residents’ 
‘autonomous organizations’ or co-governing organizations (referred to by this paper as 
‘community councils’). In this way, residents will be able to propose and discuss their own 
community public service agenda by majority voting, which can then be submitted to the 
community council for discussion. Items on the agenda are then prioritized and ranked, 
potential beneficiaries are taken into account, then some items are selected and packed into 
a ‘project’. Subsequently, an application for funding is made to the government. By 
promoting the self-organization of community residents and incorporating it in the supply 
process of community public services, it is possible to provide demand-oriented public 
services and advance local governments’ supply-side reform.  
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Furthermore, regardless of the local government’s original intention, in the practical 
outworking of the supply-side reform process, under the guidance of local governments and 
with the support of community public service funds, we can see that community residents’ 
self-governance activities are gradually integrated at the community level. The key factors 
involved in localized practices of state-made society include administrative, economic and 
social elements.   
 
The driving forces of state-made society 
Our data shows that there are three main driving forces behind ‘state-made society’. First, it 
is designed to increase the legitimacy of grassroots political power. If we divide the regime’s 
legitimacy into four dimensions - political, legal, performance and social - it is not difficult to 
see that, in the current social context, legal and political legitimacy are more stable, whereas 
performance and social legitimacy have more flexibility, and have incremental legitimacy. 
The localized practice of state-made society enhances the ‘incremental legitimacy’ of the 
regime. Since ancient times, the legitimacy of China’s political regime has to a large extent 
relied on the government’s political achievements (Zhao, 2009).  
In recent years, the government’s performance legitimacy has gradually moved away 
from ‘macro performance’ (i.e. developing the economy and raising the GDP), towards 
‘micro-performance’ (i.e. the welfare benefits enjoyed by residents, better services, and a 
sense of gain in everyday life). Shenyang, Nanjing, Shanghai and Wuhan have all 
introduced relevant policies, calling a halt to investment functions and economic assessment 
indicators for the street offices. This is to encourage them to put more energy into public 
services and management. If we take ‘social legitimacy’ to mean the political power to 
mobilize social participation and achieve social trust and recognition, then community public 
services supply-side reforms not only offer residents a way of expressing their needs, but 
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also allow them to see the government’s responsiveness to their needs. Residents can also 
experience the effects of a service-oriented government: which both raises its social 
legitimacy and their satisfaction with it. 
Second, ‘state-made society’ aims to lessen the powerlessness sometimes found in 
the self-organization of grassroots communities and their potential to create social instability. 
As outlined above, for a long time, a stereotypical view of state-society relations prevailed: 
namely, that they were mutually antagonistic and polarized. Therefore, in order to lower and 
avoid potential risks and uncertainties, some local governments tend to maintain a passive, 
cautious, guarded attitude towards the growth of social forces.  
As part of China’s ongoing modernization project, the state has also raised its 
requirements for the development of society, while local governments are paying more 
attention to reducing the powerlessness and disorderliness of residents’ self-organization 
and trying to help solve social problems instead of covering them up: with a view to 
enhancing a stable, unified society and promoting the positive aspects of harmonious 
development. For example, a local authority from City Z, G District, said in the introduction to 
‘community public service funds’: “Every person has 24 hours each day, and apart from 
eating, drinking and sleeping, and apart from going to work, every person still has some 
spare time. In this spare time, if we don’t give people something to do, people may find bad 
things to do and rock the boat. . . It’s better to encourage people to participate in more 
meaningful, more positive activities” (local authority member A from Z City G District 
government, 20160706). 
Finally, ‘state-made society’, according to informants from the local authorities, 
enhances the administrative effectiveness of the government and reduces its administrative 
costs. It is difficult for local governments to interact with community residents: so they help 
them select their own representatives and let the latter discover the residents’ needs and 
express them to the government. In the past, Chinese local governments used to spend a lot 
52 
 
of money on community public service, but always decided by themselves what to provide 
for the residents. Today, the emphasis is on local governments enabling residents to decide 
themselves, before trying to meet their needs. For example, in City B, D District, staff A at 
the Civil Affairs Bureau said: “Its policy is to let residents do what they themselves have 
thought of doing, and what they themselves are able to do” (Staff A of the Civil Affairs 
Bureau of City B, D District, 20160624). In this way, argue the local authorities, they not only 
enhance the government’s administrative efficiency and ease the pressures of its 
administrative system, but also reduce its administrative costs.  
In addition, as we shall see, in recent years in community public services, the ‘state-
made society’ mode of social creation has been increasing.  
 
The route to actualizing “state-made society” 
The ‘state-made society’ method of social creation is mainly actualized by means of the 
following channels. First: the creation of the governance platform and process of choosing 
representatives. In order to enable community residents’ public service needs to be 
presented and expressed in a coherent manner, local governments (mainly municipal and 
district ones) often require communities to set up their own self-organizing platforms. These 
are variously called, ‘community residents’ council’, ‘community council’, ‘Courtyard 
Residents Autonomous Council’, or ‘council for promoting community harmony’.  
From this range, we can identify self-organized platforms based on the whole 
community, as well as ‘micro’ ones based on smaller spatial units (i.e. courtyards and 
buildings). For example, City C, N district, in principle, allows old courtyards to form their 
own courtyard, housing or family committees; courtyard or residents’ councils. Members of a 
community council always consist of representatives from the Community Party Committee, 
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Community Residents’ Committees, the workstation, the house-owners’ committee, the 
property management enterprise, danweis dwellings, and social organizations.  
However, most community council members are residents’ representatives. For 
example, City Z, H District stipulates that the Community Council is a community-level 
agency, which consists of 15-17 members, comprised of the following: two Community Party 
Committee members; three Community Residents’ Committee members; one or two 
delegates from the National People’s Congress; two representatives from community 
enterprises and institutions (including property); and 6-9 representatives from amongst the 
local residents, thereby ensuring diversity of representation. This differs from earlier practice, 
where only representatives from the community were involved, creating possible tensions.  
Platform numbers might range from a dozen or so to tens of dozens of people. The 
platform’s leading force is normally the Community Residents’ Committee, which usually 
occupies a central position. In addition, the way in which residents’ representatives are 
chosen differs from council to council: some are chosen by direct election. In City Z, H 
District, buildings serve as a unit, with each building selecting their own representatives; 
then, from among these, some are elected to become members of the community council. In 
contrast, some are elected by community residents, formally or informally, directly onto the 
community council. In other places, the Community Party Committee and Community 
Residents’ Committee will take the place of residents to decide who can be residents’ 
representatives, and always choose trustworthy residents on whom they can rely. 
Second: the creation of the activation mechanism. The establishment of the 
Community Public Service Fund gave a certain impetus to urban community residents’ self-
organization. To begin with, it helped vocalize the needs of community residents and 
stimulate community participation. The most common need is for community landscaping, 
enhancing community services, and the construction, maintenance and transformation of 
community public spaces or infrastructure (such as community gardens, children’s 
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amusement facilities and parking lots). As these issues are closely related to the interests of 
residents, it is easier to mobilize then to enter the communal sphere, focus on communal 
public affairs, and enthusiastically explore community affairs. Moreover, as the data shows, it 
has activated community organizations - especially cultural and entertainment ones – those 
organizations which help the weak and the vulnerable; and voluntary service organizations. 
These often rely on existing organizational structures to compete for the Community Public 
Service Funds.  
The establishment of the Community Public Service Fund also activated some of the 
community’s ‘dormant organizations’. In the years prior, some places had already set up the 
equivalent of community councils, but many existed in name only. The injection of 
Community Public Service Funds not only provides new focus for these organizations, but 
also “gives them more substantial power to mobilize and allocate the community’s financial 
resources” (Local authority member B from City Z, G District government, 20160706).  
The next stage is to formulate the rules of the community. When establishing 
‘community councils’, many local governments will require them to develop different levels of 
community rules: like Community Convention, Neighbourhood Convention, Community 
Rules of Procedure and Community Processes. In City C, J District, for example, when 
applying for Community Public Service Funds, it is necessary for residents to be self-
organized before they can make an application. In this way, some communities, given their 
unique characteristics do, via face-to-face, internet and mobile phone channels, collect 
community residents’ ideas and suggestions, promote their sense of identity and belonging, 
and advocate for their participation in creating community rules. In this way, “residents there 
are more likely to obey the rules set by themselves” (Staff A of the Civil Affairs Bureau of 
City C, 20151201).  
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Of course, some communities simply copy the residents’ convention of other 
communities; and residents then do not care strongly about the rules, because they did not 
determine these for themselves. There is thus less incentive to keep the rules. 
Finally, we come to the creation of factors that shape participation. Willingness and 
ability to participate are two variables that affect participation rates. Although the injection of 
Community Public Service Funds has greatly stimulated community residents’ interest in 
community public affairs, this does not necessarily demonstrate that participants already 
possess the ability to negotiate a meeting under the guiding principles of openness, fairness, 
equality and reasonableness.  
To facilitate the smooth and orderly development of community councils, some local 
governments have engaged with selected social organizations which are good at community 
empowerment to promote residents’ ability of participating in community affairs. Through 
democratic consultation training, they want to improve the allocation of community public 
service funds. For example, oriented towards Community Residents’ Committee members 
and residents themselves, City B, D District, commissioned professional social workers to 
teach them consultation techniques and how to organize and host meetings. They also drew 
up a “community consultation operation process manual” for them. Through the realization 
channels referred to above, ‘state-made society’, this grassroots social governance 
innovation initiative, is gradually making progress. This in turn can also serve to strengthen 
the state. 
 
Section 4: Evaluating ‘state-made society’ 
The local practice of ‘state-made society’ is informed and shaped by the supply-side reform 
of urban community public services, which means letting residents themselves decide what 
kinds of community services they want. As far as most local governments are concerned, 
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their objective is to raise the level of grassroots social governance and public services. In 
this scenario, promoting ‘the creation of society’ is a by-product; an unexpected result. But 
the objective impact of this practice, to a greater or lesser extent, is that using the 
government-organized method slowly promotes urban community residents’ social self-
organization.  
For urban community-level creation of society, this practice offers a new direction and 
an unforeseen force for the mutual empowerment of state and society. However, worthy of 
further attention and reflection is that there appears to be a discrepancy between the 
government’s policy documents and their practice of promoting ‘state-made society’. The 
state’s empowerment of society does not always help bring about its internal energization, 
and at times even results in the exact opposite: restricting and limiting its creation. 
 
‘Independence’ or ‘dependence’ - the urgency of system movement 
When the administrative system is in its daily operation, a ‘political tournament’ and 
‘administrative cycles’ often co-exist (Zhou, 2007; Qu, Zhou & Ying, 2009). Higher level 
governments (like cities or districts) hope to be quick and efficient when determining work 
tasks and setting responsibilities, while lower level governments (like streets and 
communities), when implementing these tasks, frequently impose ever higher targets for 
each administrative level below their own, improving completion rates at each. This means 
they can finish their duties in a short time, within the time constraints of the administrative 
term of their leaders, thereby increasing their chances of upward mobility in the bureaucratic 
system. This practice operates in both the establishment of community councils and 
community public service requirements.  
In order to improve efficiency, the Community Party Committee and Community 
Residents’ Committee have sometimes crossed a line and exceeded their duties, either by 
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directly choosing ‘trustworthy’ residents’ representatives to enter the Community Council, or 
establishing community public service objectives on behalf of the people. Equally, local 
governments’ assessment indicators frequently emphasize measurable indicators (for 
example, whether there is a community council set up or not, the frequency of activities, the 
number of public service requirements generated, etc.) and overlook that grassroots 
community self-organization is a process that is steadily accumulative, where consolidation 
takes place over the longer term, and is relatively slow in becoming effective.  
There is still significant tension between the progressive nature of social growth and 
the urgency of ‘policy implementation’. Therefore, although the Community Public Service 
Funds policy was designed to enhance the autonomy of community residents, in order to be 
quick and efficient and win in ‘political championships’, sometimes street office and 
Community Residents’ Committees will again represent residents and not allow them to 
decide for themselves. This in turn will make community residents rely more on central, 
government, instead of becoming more independent and autonomous.   
In City Z, G District, for example, the district community public services fund has a 
yearly quota of almost one hundred million Yuan, which should greatly help improve living 
standards, raise community public service levels, and promote community residents’ 
autonomy. But after a trial period, the person responsible for the project reflected: 
Originally we hoped that ordinary people would propose their own motions, but it was 
very hard to actually realize this. Basically, it was easier to return to the governments 
leading and its proposals. One year is so short, there are a lot of funds and projects 
to manage, and within a one-year period ordinary people are not capable of 
proposing so many motions. We must think of a way to control this problem... young 
people in City Z rarely have time to deal with this situation because life is so stressful, 
and the time they have for participating in civic affairs is so limited... A certain level of 
empowerment is necessary. If the residents’ right to stay informed about, participate 
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in and express views on community public affairs are not protected, they will lose 
interest in participating in such affairs and will not attend the Community Council 
either. What we need to do next is to make the councils more truly representative, 
more expressive of the people’s opinions, and less about a few men making 
decisions, because that way is truly frightening (Author’s translation) (Local authority 
member C from City Z, G District government, 20160708). 
This shows that if local authorities, in order to be more efficient, do not act in accordance 
with the newly established rules, they will gradually lose public trust and participation.  
 
‘Integration’ or ‘fragmentation’ - partial empowerment in policy implementation 
In the process of establishing community councils, deciding on their representatives, and 
establishing their rules, the community’s inherent power structures are subsequently 
challenged: especially the authority of the Community Workstation and the Community 
Residents’ Committee. Due to living at the end of the bureaucratic structure, street offices 
and Community Residents’ Committees frequently adapt a ‘flexible’ interpretation and 
implementation of higher levels of government’s ‘standardized’ policy; and through ‘partial 
empowerment’, maintain the stability of the existing power structure. The common form of 
expression is to only bestow on community residents the right to know, the right to express, 
the right to participate, the right to consult and the right to inspect with relation to ‘community 
public service funds’, while retaining the right to make decisions, and at times to veto the 
decisions of community councils. Thus, community councils’ decision-making strategies no 
longer rest on the council members’ votes.  
The proposer’s focus has shifted from the reasonableness of the project itself and 
moved towards obtaining the attention and recognition of persons in authority (i.e. the 
Community Residents’ Committee members). Some authority figures have not given 
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reasonable guidance to this change of focus but have been glad to see it happen. By doing 
so, they could maintain their authority and the inherent power structure in the community. In 
short, they are still at the peak of the community power structure. Therefore, it is easier for 
them to fulfil the tasks given by local government and maintain stability. 
Consider City Z, H District, W community as an example. In 2012, H District’s Civil 
Affairs Bureau selected W community for a pilot scheme, to explore establishing a 
community public service fund named the ‘happiness fund’. More than 20 community council 
members were elected from among the residents themselves, who were responsible for 
discussing how to use the fund and, according to ‘Robert’s Rules of Order’, forming the 
community’s 10 procedural rules. Afterwards, there was a honeymoon period between these 
council members and the community’s rules of procedure. During the meetings of the 
community council, members were able to strictly comply with the community’s rules of 
procedure, and pass several beneficial resolutions.  
In 2014, W community started to hold elections of the Community Residents’ 
Committee for a new term. According to the proposals of the district’s Civil Affairs Bureau, 
Mr G., seen as a fair-minded man, became a candidate for Director of the new Community 
Residents’ Committee. If Mr. G were elected, he had the right to “form a cabinet” from 
among the local residents. To this end, Mr. G had done a lot of publicity work and featured 
several candidates for the Community Residents’ Committee; but the idea was not 
successfully realized, as he:   
Because I myself am not a party member… The original deputy director of the 
Community Residents’ Committee wanted a second term... So he took advantage of 
my identity as a non-party member and appealed to the street office, arguing that it 
would be no good to assign a non-party member as Director of the new Community 
Residents’ Committee. Thus when it came time to vote, the big slogan had already 
been changed to “elect the Community Residents’ Committee’s principal” and not 
60 
 
“director”. (Author’s translation) (Resident G from City Z, H District W Community, 
20151028) 
In order to lower the risk of instability, the street office authorities would rather maintain the 
original community governance structure than reform it. 
Afterwards, the original deputy director of the Community Residents’ Committee 
became the new Community Residents’ Committee’s Director, and Mr. G became its Deputy 
Director. One of Mr. G’s original candidates, Ms. H, thus could not become one of the 
committee members. As Mr. G’s initial promise to form a cabinet that included Ms. H was not 
fully honoured, the situation also produced feelings of animosity amongst the residents. It 
was hard for them to form a consensus, discussion gradually became personal rather than 
impersonal, and ill-will gradually grew. Just as W community’s Ms H explained: 
Originally, the rules of the community council meeting were that each person could 
speak for 3 minutes, but then it got to a stage where this was not controlled. If you 
don’t agree with me, no matter what you say, I will oppose your opinions and 
suggestions… Over several thousand years China has developed a habit, if ordinary 
people have any issues they look to the government, and they’d like to listen to 
whatever the government says. But you (neighbours) are small people, we are all 
ordinary residents in the same community, you are equal to me, thus you have no 
authority over me. For example, when a person from the Community Residents’ 
Committee says “Quiet” during a Community Council meeting, everybody will obey 
his order rather than their neighbours’ order (Author’s translation) (Resident H from Z 
City H District W Community, 20151028). 
This shows how factions and fragmentation among community residents began to appear 
due to partial empowerment in policy implementation. Therefore, gradually, W community 
council members no longer adhered to the community’s 10 procedural rules. In addition, it 
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was difficult for them to form a consensus through voting. At the same time, the Community 
Party Committee and Community Residents’ Committee also gradually strengthened their 
intervention into the resolutions of the community council. As the Party Secretary said: 
Nowadays, the entire design process of the proceedings is like this: The Community 
Residents’ Committee receives the residents’ proposals, the Community Party 
Committee initially reviews it, then the Community Residents’ Committee reviews it, 
and then the community council gives it a final review. Possibly in some practical 
operations, for example, some projects may involve questions regarding social 
stability, it is necessary to give more comprehensive consideration, and on these 
occasions, after the final review, it needs to come back to the Community Party 
Committee for comprehensive consideration, and the Community Party Committee 
has the right to veto the proposal (Author’s translation) (Secretary of Community 
Party Committee from Z City H District W Community, 20151026). 
Over time, fewer and fewer residents have taken part in the community council, and forming 
resolutions is becoming harder and harder. W community’s experiment in autonomy, when 
considered from several viewpoints, “can be said to have failed” (Director of the Civil Affairs 
Bureau of Z city, H District, 20151029). This again shows that with the aggravation of 
internal fragmentation amongst community residents, the inherent community power 
structure is further strengthened. 
 
‘Decentralization’ or ‘Centralization’? Internal structural tensions in the bureaucratic 
system 
‘Devolution’ (还权), or the empowerment of society to be self-organized (赋能), and the 
promotion of effective governance functions (归位), are common terms in the prevailing 
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policy discourse on government implementation of community public services supply-side 
reforms.  However, with regards to ‘giving rights to the residents’, or ‘decentralization’, the 
different levels of the bureaucratic system (district, street, community) frequently have 
different criteria and use different logic in their decision-making processes. The most 
common is that there is often a certain level of structural tension between government 
planned ‘decentralization’ at district level, and actually executed ‘centralization’ at the street 
and community level. Take City Z, H District W community, for example. According to H 
District’s Civil Affairs Bureau introduction:  
Originally we had this tentative plan - W community has elected more than 20 
community council members amongst all the residents, right? We’ve planned to let 
them decide all public affairs within the community. We expected that after a few 
years, the residents’ ability of self-governance will gradually increase and they could 
also learn the skills of rational negotiation (Director of the Civil Affairs Bureau of Z 
City H District, 20151029).  
However, because the pilot scheme was relatively “ahead of its time”, and there was no 
existing role model, in practice, the street office and Community Party Committee had a 
relatively large degree of autonomy. W community’s Party Secretary, when discussing the 
community council’s decision-making process, had this to say:  
For each residents’ motion, the Community Party Committee (on behalf of the CCP) 
and the Community Residents’ Committee (on behalf of local governments) must 
both review it and decide whether or not the motion is reasonable. If it is reasonable, 
it needs to be discussed by the council and during this discussion the Community 
Party Committee and the Community Residents’ Committee have to decide whether 
or not it is feasible to implement it. Without this framework, many residents will 
become more and more arrogant and want to have the final say on community affairs 
all by themselves. That might cause tremendous trouble. If the Community Party 
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Committee has the right to veto, things would be under control (Author’s translation) 
(Director of Community Residents’ Committee from City Z, H District W Community, 
20151026).  
Here, we can see that, compared to public policy innovation, stability which could be easier 
achieved by centralization is of much more importance. From the Community Residents’ 
Committee’s point of view, centralization instead of decentralization at community level has 
three benefits. First, it counters the ‘pressure systems’ of political contests (Rong et al., 
1998); second, it preserves the intrinsic power structure and authority of the Community 
Residents’ Committee; third, it reduces the ‘unstable risks’ of devolution to the society. From 
the street offices’ point of view, they often tacitly acquiesce in the Community Residents’ 
Committees’ “flexibility and expediency” and their “selective handling” (Yang & Yu, 2012) 
when implementing higher level policies.  
As grassroots street offices, which have limited power and resources but unlimited 
responsibilities, want to quickly and efficiently complete the administrative orders issued by 
higher levels, they still have to depend on Community Residents’ Committees: who can help 
them a lot by fulfilling specific administrative tasks and mobilizing local residents. At the 
same time, the stability of the community is also a buffer zone for the street office. Therefore, 
both sides “conspire” (Zhou, 2008) to maintain structural stability. After all, with the 
pressures of ‘political correctness’ and “stability overrides everything”, maintaining stability 
seems to be more rational than facing uncertainties brought about by innovation. Therefore, 
taking advantage of the “fuzzy contract” (Huang, 2015) given by city or district level 
government agencies, street offices and Community Residents’ Committees borrow “the 
visible hand” and “the invisible hand” (Wang & Wu, 2011), and realize the self-replication 
and self-reproduction of grassroots communities’ governance structures.  
Given the various reasons outlined above, we still cannot make too perfunctory or too 
optimistic a judgement. Although in recent years, some local governments have helped 
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community residents become self-organized in the process of urban community public 
service provision, on the evidence of this case study analysis, we still cannot reach the 
conclusion that it has already become an effective route to creating community-level society. 
Section 5: Conclusion and discussion 
This article took ‘state-society’ relations as a starting point: clarifying former 
misunderstandings about this key relationship, then making preliminary remarks about the 
developmental trend of ‘mutual empowerment’ between state and society. The discussion 
then returned to a question of general concern for sociologists: “Where does society come 
from?”, a traditional theoretical question concerning ‘the creation of society’.  
In China, sociological researchers used to think that society could grow 
spontaneously in the community (which could be the first route to the creation of society). 
However, over the past few years, they have been somewhat disappointed in this regard. 
With the changing relationships between the state and society, the level of residents’ ‘self-
organization’ did indeed increase somewhat, but it is growing extremely slowly and still not to 
the extent that proponents in academic circles anticipated. They expected a society born in 
the public sphere in the community: external to, and independent from, the state and the 
markets, having a relatively high degree of autonomy and public spiritedness. In recent 
years, through local governments’ practice of “optimizing the supply structure of urban 
community public services”, some of them have helped residents organize themselves, 
establish Community Councils, give them some funds and let them discuss and decide for 
themselves how to spend their money.  
However, in practice, local governments have merely set up a platform (Community 
Council) for the residents to run by themselves. In this scenario, we can see that it is the 
external force (from the government) (他组织) that helps the residents become self-
organized (自组织): which in turn could become a second route to the creation of society.  
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By analysing this new path to the development of ‘state-made society’, this paper 
reached the following conclusions.  First, as far as most local governments are concerned, 
‘creating society’ is merely an ‘intermediate product’ or ‘unintended consequence’, brought 
about during the process of increasing its own incremental legitimacy, reducing grassroots 
society’s self-organization, powerlessness and disorderliness, and raising the efficiency of 
government administration - while also reducing its costs. In the localized practice of 
‘government making society’, there is still not enough evidence to conclude that the state is 
deliberately doing this. 
Second, it is undeniable that the local practice of ‘state-made society’ has a positive 
effect on both government and society. From the former’s point of view, local governments 
have not only improved the public services supply structure, but have also raised its 
efficiency and accelerated the transformation of government functions in responding 
efficiently to projects proposed by community councils and local governments. Moreover, 
this has frequently optimized the speed of response between different levels of government 
and different agencies and branches of it. It has led to the development of effective 
collaborative services that have increased the wellbeing of community residents.  
From society’s point of view, incentivized by ‘economic elements’ (Community Public 
Service Funds), under the guidance of ‘administrative elements’ (local governments), we 
can, to a certain extent, see the integration and reorganization of ‘social elements’ 
(residents’ autonomy) at the community level. On the one hand, the practice of urban 
community residents’ self-organization, driven by external forces, has inspired and trained 
community members, especially those who are passionate and concerned about community 
public affairs, into participating in grassroots democratic consultations. On the other, this 
kind of practice has established a connection between residents’ ‘self-organization’ and 
residents’ ‘public spiritedness’, which helps push them from ‘cultural spaces’ or ‘reciprocal 
spaces’ (which are only small scale interest groups or for mutual entertainment and benefit) 
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towards more extensive, communal ‘political public spaces’. Objectively speaking, it has 
promoted the construction of “social infrastructure” (Gu, 2004) and urban community level 
social creation. Therefore, it can be said that the local practice of ‘state-made society’ is 
indeed beneficial: for the case study material suggests that it promotes mutual 
empowerment of state and society.  
  Third, we still need to avoid being too hasty or overly optimistic in concluding that the 
local practice of ‘government-organized’ promotion of the ‘self-organization’ of society has 
become an effective way of promoting social creation at the community level. After all, during 
the process of ‘state-made society’, it is still possible to see a divergence between ‘policy 
documents’ and ‘policy practice’. The urgency of policy implementation, incomplete 
empowerment and bureaucratic structural tensions have all, to a certain extent, not 
succeeded in enhancing the self-organizational level of grassroots community; rather, they 
have increased community residents’ dependence on the government and internal divisions, 
as well as increasing the centralization of grassroots government: thereby advancing the 
reproduction of ‘dependence’, ‘fragmentation’ and ‘centralization’. Helping maintain the 
stability and self-replication of grassroots level social governance structure actually makes it 
more difficult for it to be reformed. 
 In summary, whether it is ‘intentionally’ or ‘unintentionally’ ‘state-made society’, the 
present findings suggest that, objectively speaking, the post-16th Committee governance 
reforms have, to a greater or lesser extent, reshaped grassroots’ social power structures, 
optimized the prevailing model of grassroots social governance and released the space, 
opportunities and possibilities for the creation of society. However, the original intentions, 
implementation logic and objective results of ‘state-made society’ still need more detailed 
observation and in-depth analysis.  
After all, state power not only shapes the physical space of urban society; but within 
that physical space, it can also shape the benefit structure and social relations between 
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people. The state’s institutional arrangements for grassroots-level social governance and 
social services limit the power boundaries, dynamic mechanisms, and both the practice and 
the direction of social creation. On the one hand, this provides an opportunity for social 
creation; yet on the other, it possibly creates distortions in social creation. At the same time, 
residents’ self-organization produced by local governments can sometimes encounter 
greater instability, because it may be mixed with personal interest, lack substantive 
representation and effective checks and balances.  
Some Community Residents’ Councils, although they have the organizational 
frameworks for residents’ autonomy, nonetheless lack the true essence of residents’ 
autonomy. These frameworks operate as the “mere skeleton” or “appendages” (Foster, 
2002): something deeply embedded in the logic of the local bureaucracy. They have not yet 
played a sufficient role in optimizing the community public services supply process, neither 
improved the grassroots social governance structure, nor promoted community residents’ 
autonomy and the creation of society. Therefore, we cannot simply judge whether ‘self-
organized’ or ‘government-organized’ is the best way to analyse contemporary urban 
governance developments in China. It is true that we cannot deny the importance of the 
‘self-organized’ path for ‘social creation’, yet it is still necessary to explore the effective 
transformation mechanism of ‘government-organized’ promotion of society’s ‘self-
organization’.  
The limitations of the present research are that in order to discuss things at the 
macro level, in most cases, ‘local government’ has been used to replace ‘the state’: thus, 
there is the danger of simplifying the meaning of the latter. At the same time, ‘local 
government’ itself is not a homogenized whole – it has different internal power structures, 
bureaucratic systems, segmentations and benefit differentiations. There is scope for further 
consideration of what characterizes successful ‘social creation’. During the process of 
analysing ‘state-made society’, more attention has been paid to the state’s perspective, to 
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the detriment of the tactics and responses of society itself (as well as those of ‘market 
bodies’ and ‘social organizations’). In future research, these areas need further detailed 
consideration.  
Finally, in the current social context, perhaps it is only the state’s ‘empowering effect’, 
via the ‘complete empowerment’ of society, which promotes society’s ‘self-creation’ and 
realizes state and society’s ‘mutual empowerment’, which can indeed optimize China’s 
‘state-society’ relations, and promote the health, harmony, stability and development of 
society.  
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3. Structural Differentiation: Social organizations in contemporary Chinese 
community governance 
Xiang Jinglin 
Abstract: Against the backdrop of the contrast between the rapid development of social 
organizations (SOs) and the limited effect of their participation in community governance, this 
paper discusses the relationship between social organizations and community governance. 
Its analytical framework explores SOs’ external environment and the match between supply 
and demand across different governance levels. Specifically, it focuses on the problem of 
matching supply and demand with respect to social organizations and community governance; 
and analyses the key factors responsible for this inadequate matching as well as possible 
solutions. The study shows the following: i) from the perspective of demand, embeddedness 
and professionality are two basic requirements that social organizations need, in order to 
support community governance. However, on the supply side, structural differentiation has 
occurred among social organizations engaged in community governance, where floating 
professional social organization (PSOs) (with a low level of embeddedness), weak community-
based social organizations (with a low level of professionality), a small number of ideal social 
organizations (with a high level of embeddedness and professionality) and other types of 
social organizations (with a low level of embeddedness and professionality) coexist, resulting 
in an inadequate match between supply and demand. ii) The top-down government 
environment and bottom-up community environment are key in affecting structural 
differentiation, and the core influencing mechanism is resource dependence. iii) A possible 
solution is to strengthen the embeddedness of PSOs and promote the professionalization of 
community-based social organizations, enabling better understanding of the practice and 
exploration of grassroots governance. 
 
74 
 
Keywords: Community governance (CG); structural differentiation (SD); professional social 
organization (PSO); community-based social organization (CBSO). 
 
Introduction 
In recent years, pushing social organizations to participate in community governance (CG) 
has become an important measure aimed at the modernization of China's social 
governance system, and formed an important part of governance capacity-building. To this 
end, the Chinese government has issued several guidelines and policies regarding social 
organizations. For example, in 2013, the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party 
of China (CPC) proposed “innovating the social governance system, [and] improving the 
way of social governance and stimulating the vitality of social organizations”, placing the 
focus on fostering and giving priority to developing four types of social organizations, 
including those providing urban and rural community services. Subsequently, in 2016, the 
General Offices of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council issued their Opinions 
on Reforming the Social Organizations Administration System and Promoting Their 
Orderly and Healthy Development, proposing "making great efforts to foster and develop 
community-based social organizations (CBSOs).”  
In 2017, the Report to the 19th CPC National Congress made it clear that it is 
essential to "build a social governance pattern of co-construction, co-governance and 
sharing.... strengthen the CG system, shift the focus of social governance to the 
community level, bring social organizations into play, and realize the benign iinteraction of 
government, governance, social regulation and resident autonomy.” On the other hand, 
local governments across the country pursued innovation in social governance, investing 
considerable resources in promoting the participation of social organizations in CG. From 
this point of view, the participation of social organizations in community governance 
generally has a good institutional basis.  
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It is not difficult to find confusing phenomena, nevertheless, if a closer look is taken at 
the practice of social organizations’ participation in CG. On the one hand, as the government 
system stepped up top down policy communication and encouraged innovative practices in 
social governance at grassroots level – with reforms introduced one after another – this 
frequently led to lowered requirements on the registration of social organizations and 
increased purchase of services from social organizations, with a large number of hub-type 
social organizations established. As a result, social organizations increased rapidly in 
number11: especially those providing various kinds of social services, many of which were 
contracted by governments to provide communities with services in various forms. In the 
meantime, CBSOs also received financial support from communities and their Party 
organizations.  
On the other hand, as observed by many researchers and leaders of grassroots, 
community Party and autonomous mass organizations, the practical role that social 
organizations play in CG is still very limited. Social organizations have limited autonomy, 
incline to offer services rather than participate in governance, rarely go deep into communities, 
have inadequate capabilities to deal with a broader range of problems, and are not strong 
enough to sustain themselves as independent actors. Moreover, for different communities, 
social organizations differ considerably in the effects of their participating in CG. 
The governance reforms mentioned above raise key questions that we will discuss in 
the course of this article. For example: what is the significance of the stark contrast between 
the rapid development of social organizations (e.g. their quantity, scale, pace of development, 
etc.) and the limited effects of their participating in CG? Why is such contrast ubiquitous, what 
causes it, and what possible ways may there be to deal with this problem? No studies to date 
have provided a systematic and proper explanation.  
                                                          
11 Studies show that, as of 2016, China had 702,000 social organizations altogether, an increase of 
155,000 from 2012 (Yang Yiyong and Huang Yanfen, 2017). If unregistered CBSOs were included, 
the total number of social organizations in China would be much bigger. 
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A review of the exiting research shows it mainly covers the following three aspects: 
first, studies have focused on the relationship between the state/government and social 
organizations. These emphasize the government's administrative systems and strategies 
regarding social organizations, often proposing a range of concepts to describe the 
relationship between the government and social organizations (e.g. "macroscopic 
encouragement, microscopic constraint" (Yu Keping, 2006), "control by classifications" (Kang 
Xiaoguang and Han Heng, 2005), "control and support" (Tao Chuanjin, 2008), "interest 
convergence" (Jiang Hua et al, 2011), and "development by classifications" (Tian Kai, 2016)).  
This research holds that the government has two basic attitudes or management 
strategies concerning social organizations: namely, control and development. The former is 
the central reason for the limited development of social organizations. Yet such authors pay 
attention to the relationship between the government and social organizations, not that of 
social organizations to communities. They presuppose a linear relationship between the 
official constraint of the system and the development of social organizations - but provide no 
analysis of the relationship between the development of social organizations and the effects 
of social governance. Furthermore, these studies focus more on macroscopic structural 
discussion than research into microscopic mechanisms. 
Second: studies that focus on empirical models regarding social organizations 
participating in social governance. Based on the texts of national and local governments, these 
focus on the role that social organizations are expected to have in CG. They also discuss how 
to push for their participation in CG, identify local empirical practices (Guan Xinping, 2011; 
Gao Hong, 2011) and what actual problems there are in this respect, and summarize effective 
paths and concrete ways of pushing for social organizations' participation in CG. Such studies 
pay more attention to normative research than substantive outcomes of participation. In some 
cases, an analytical framework has been developed, yet the research has failed to answer 
why, despite government efforts, there are still less than expected effects of social 
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organizations' participation in CG. In addition, there is a lack of detailed empirical research 
(Yu Jianxing and Jin Lei, 2012). 
Third, studies have focused on the practical institutional environment and its influence 
on social organizations. Studies on this level in recent years have attempted to break with the 
above-mentioned macroscopic and microscopic studies and analyse: with the logic chain from 
"the institutional environment to social organizations to outcomes of governance" as their point 
of departure. They have focused on the characteristics of the institutional environment 
confronting social organizations, as well as outcomes of governance emanating from them 
(Huang Xiaochun, 2014, 2015, 2017). These studies have noted that the project system 
affects the structure of CG; its intrinsic technical rationality leads to such problems with social 
organizations as dependence on projects and estrangement from communities, inadequate 
sustainability, and imbalance of development (Yu Jinmei et al., 2014; Zhang Qiongwen et al., 
2015).  
This research, however, has focused mainly on the impact of the transformation in the 
government's governance mechanism over social organizations (Huang Xiaochun and Zhou 
Li'an, 2017). Moreover, it has failed to examine the problem theoretically by examining the 
links between social organizations, government and communities; and in rare cases, unveil 
the structural characteristics of the sphere of social organizations. 
To sum up, existing studies have focused more on the relationship between the state 
and society or between the government and social organizations (to discuss the 
characteristics of the environment in which social organizations operate), than that between 
social organizations and communities and related examinations of the matching mechanisms 
between them. Research to date lacks a bottom-up perspective relative to communities or 
developed from the field of social organizations; and is unable to provide fundamental, 
systematic and mechanism-oriented thinking for understanding the relationship between 
social organizations and CG. Therefore, this article attempts to start from the perspective of 
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organizational sociology and focus on the match between social organizations and CG, 
influencing factors and possible solutions, providing analytical thinking on the issue at hand. 
This article builds a theoretical framework that comprises "external environment, 
supply-demand matching, and governance level,” through which to analyse problems with 
social organization participating in CG. Here the external environment means that where social 
organizations participate in CG, including the top-down government environment and the 
bottom-up community environment; supply-demand matching refers to the matching 
relationship between demand which communities have for social organizations and the supply 
which the latter offer to meet what the former demand; and governance level is the degree to 
which social organizations participate in and interact with CG. 
The ensuing analysis has three parts. First, it looks at the match between demand-side 
CG and supply-side social organizations and points out the limited effects of social 
organizations participating in CG. This shows that the problem is essentially the inadequate 
match between supply and demand. In other words, social organizations fail to satisfy what 
communities demand. Second, we analyse environmental factors that affect supply-demand 
matching. Finally, the paper examines the consequences of inadequate supply-demand 
matching, as well as proposing solutions that grassroots governments and communities could 
introduce to improve the supply-demand relationship. 
 
Social Organizations and CG: Supply-demand matching 
On the demand side: Double demand in CG for social organizations 
CG has multifarious demand for social organizations, which differ from community to 
community and are dynamic. If properly simplified theoretically, this article believes that CG 
social organizations exhibit two features: embeddedness, the degree to which social 
organizations are embedded in communities (Zhang Qiongwen, 2015); and professionality, 
the professional ability that social organizations have to deal with problems about CG. These 
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two aspects may be used as basic yardsticks by which to measure the supply-demand 
matching relationship between social organizations and CG. 
Embeddedness reflects the degree of correlation/integration between social 
organizations and communities: with indicators measuring, among other things, to what 
degree social organizations grasp community demand, understand cultural and value systems 
of communities, earn trust from community residents and networking resources and take root 
in communities. The reason embeddedness is required is that it has a direct effect on whether 
the actual operation of social organizations accord with community development. 
Professionality reflects the capabilities of social organizations participating in CG 
(Guan Xinping, 2011): including such indicators as the quantity and level of full-time 
employees, professionals, expertise, technical facilities, internal management and other 
aspects of social organizations, which determines to what degree social organizations can 
deal with problems others cannot, and help improve the efficiency or quality of CG. The reason 
professionality is significant is that it has a direct effect on the capacity of social organizations 
to address community problems practically. 
If we combine these two dimensions, we may divide social organizations participating 
in CG into four ideal types (see Figure 1). In the figure below, A stands for social organizations 
with a higher level of both embeddedness and professionality; B for social organizations with 
a higher level of embeddedness and a lower level of professionality; C for social organizations 
with a lower level of embeddedness and a higher level of professionality; and D for those with 
a lower level of both embeddedness and professionality. Generally speaking, A and D are 
types of social organization for which the degree of CG demand is highest and lowest 
respectively; while B and C are two types of social organization for which the degree of CG 
demand is moderate. The arrows between them mean that the government or communities 
have a demand for changing social organizations from D to B or C to A. 
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On the Supply Side: Structural differentiation of social organizations 
Given the CG demand, social organizations on the supply side are not a monolithic bloc and 
often, within the field, structural differentiation (SD) occurs. In other words, social organizations 
participating in CG do not all belong to one of the four types; but there is a relatively stable 
structure of their distribution among them. So-called SD means that in the process of CG, 
different types of social organizations form distinct differences from one another: which 
gradually solidify in terms of their objects of focus, actual functions, working mechanisms and 
relationships with communities. 
To urban and rural communities in contemporary China, there are two main categories 
of social organization participating in CG: (1) Professional social organizations (PSOs), 
created outside communities and officially registered with civil affairs authorities. These 
participate in CG by, for example, undertaking service projects that the government 
purchases, including social work service organizations that have emerged in large numbers 
in recent years. (2) CBSOs, grassroots social organizations which "are founded by community 
residents to serve urban and rural communities by providing charitable, aid, cultural, sport and 
High professionality Low professionality 
Low community embeddedness 
High community embeddedness 
A B 
D C 
Figure 1. CG Demand and Types of Social 
OOrganization 
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entertainment, and/or agricultural services"12. This second type are often not officially 
registered; instead, they’re simply put on record at sub-district offices or town governments 
and rely on self-organization and management of community residents.   
 
 
As shown in Figure 2, there is SD among social organizations participating in urban 
and rural CG. Social organizations with a higher degree of both community embeddedness 
and professionality are ideal social organizations which grassroots governments, officials and 
community residents are in dire need of, but are few in number. Most CBSOs have a higher 
degree of community embeddedness but a lower degree of professionality, with inadequate 
capabilities of governance. In contrast, most PSOs, with their relatively high degree of 
professionality, are the main body from which the government purchase services; but have a 
lower degree of community embeddedness, meaning a limited degree to which they 
participate in CG. In addition, there are also many social organizations with a lower degree of 
both community embeddedness and professionality: for example, those ‘zombie’ social 
organizations that have not been annually audited nor carried out activities for years. Given 
                                                          
12 See ‘Opinions of the Ministry of Civil Affairs on Stepping up Community-based Social 
Organizations’. 
High professionality Low professionality 
Low community embeddedness 
 
High community embeddedness 
Ideal social organizations  CBSOs  
Other social organizations PSOs 
Figure 2. SD: Supply-Side Social Organizations 
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all these social organizations, there arises the problem of overall supply-demand matching in 
relation to their participating in CG. 
Generally, the SD among social organizations participating in CG is manifest in 
different participatory situations, logic and trends, in a basic environment where 
simultaneously, there are "floating PSOs”, "weak CBSOs”, "a small number of ideal social 
organizations" and "other types of social organization”. The term ‘SD’, it should be noted, is 
used here in relation to CG. This article does not deny that different social organizations have 
different service objects and priority areas; but is intended to provide a structural picture of 
social organizations on the supply side and present their matching relationship with CG. 
Moreover, Figure 2 represents a general picture of social organizations and does not 
deny differences which may exist between PSOs or CBSOs. First, as shown by the solid line 
arrows, this article recognizes that some PSOs have a higher degree of community 
embeddedness and some CBSOs have a higher degree of professionality, including these 
social organizations in the ‘ideal’ category. In practice, we indeed could find some outstanding 
PSOs that pay particular attention to in-depth community embeddedness: manifested by, for 
instance, their being highly acquainted with and closely following community developments, 
trusted by community residents, and capable of having an accurate grip of community needs 
and mobilizing all kinds of resources at community level. On the other hand, we also may find 
some CBSOs with a higher degree of professionality, thanks to their members' diverse 
backgrounds and extensive knowledge.  
Second, as shown by the dotted line arrows, PSOs are likely to weaken professionally, 
and CBSOs in respect of embeddedness; there is the likelihood that they change into "other 
social organizations”. We indeed could find, in practice, many PSOs with a very low level of 
professionality, and many CBSOs limited to a minority of residents with a low degree of 
integration with communities, gradually declining and struggling to continue operating. 
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Supply-Demand Matching 
The SD discussed above leads to widespread inadequate supply-demand matching between 
CG and social organizations. Considering that PSOs and CBSOs are two relatively common 
types of social organizations, the following analysis focuses on the match between them and 
community demand. 
The problem with PSOs participating in CG mainly manifests itself in three aspects. 
The first is about their understanding of community demand. Due to their low embeddedness, 
PSOs often enter a community by undertaking a government-purchased service project: they 
pay attention to only a particular aspect of the community’s needs, do not have an adequate 
understanding of the community, nor a full grip on community demand. The second is about 
mechanisms for participation in governance. After entering a community, PSOs have to 
engage and collaborate with diverse stakeholders from within the community - the 
neighbourhood committee, CBSOs, residents, etc. - but if they are unable to properly do this 
and collaborate inadequately with CBSOs, they will find it difficult to earn trust from community 
residents.  
The third is about the accumulation of effects. PSOs, even if they have achieved some 
effects in respect of CG, will struggle to produce and accumulate governance effects on a 
continual basis, given their low levels of embeddedness and high degrees of mobility. Such 
effects, even if already accumulated, would be difficult to spread or extend within communities, 
given the lack of related mechanisms as a result of the PSOs’ mobility. 
In addition, the problem with CBSOs participating in CG mainly manifests itself in three 
ways. The first is about the stability of these social organizations. CBSOs are not stable in 
terms of their staffing or structure, among other respects. They are small in size, staffed much 
more by part-time employees (predominantly seniors) than full-time ones, have a high turnover 
rate of employees, and often lack competent leaders and a core team, making it hard for them 
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to operate effectively. The high instability of CBSOs in itself would affect their ability to 
participate in CG.  
The second is about the scope of jobs they can do. A lack of professionals and 
expertise hinders CBSOs in addressing problems, especially complicated or technical ones; 
often, they must turn to public or private resources of neighbourhood committees and 
residents. The third is about how effectively they participate in governance. As they lack 
professionalism, CBSOs can usually identify problems or needs but have difficulty providing 
strategies or solutions; and if anything, what results is quite general and broad, and often not 
tailored to specific circumstances. 
 
Environmental Factors and Influencing Mechanisms 
In the ensuing discussion, the article will analyse the factors influencing SD among social 
organizations participating in CG. Theoretically, there are at least four levels of factors that 
affect SD among social organizations:  the individual level, organizational level, governance 
level, and environmental level. This article mainly discusses influencing factors at the 
environmental level. 
We will follow a logical chain of "external environment - organizational characteristic - 
level of governance”, as shown in Table 1 below; and analyse different external environments 
facing PSOs and CBSOs, their operational characteristics in the corresponding environments, 
and their effects on CG. In dealing with the relationship between external environments and 
the operation of organizations, this article takes a perspective of resource dependence (Pfeffer 
& Salancik, 1978) in organizational sociology, and lays emphasis on important effects that 
sources of resource supply have on the behavioural characteristics of social organizations 
participating in CG. 
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Table 1. External Environment - Organizational Characteristic - Level of Governance 
Type of 
Organization 
Environmental 
Characteristic 
Resource 
Dependence 
Organizational 
Operation 
Problem Level of Governance 
PSO 
Responsibility 
for higher-ups 
Dependence 
on 
government 
 
Attention 
allocation 
Degree of 
embeddedness 
Degree of participation 
in governance 
CBSO Endogeneity 
Dependency 
on community 
resources 
Resource 
integration 
Degree of  
professionality 
Governance capacity 
 
The Environment for PSOs 
Responsibility for Higher-Up: Dependence on government resources.  
PSOs, generally established outside communities, mainly face an external environment that 
is more related to local governments as resource suppliers than to communities as parties in 
need of governance. They chiefly acquire resources through such mechanisms as bidding and 
government procurement, obtaining financial support from governments by applying for 
specific project funding. Many PSOs "strongly desire to acquire resources and stick to 
instrumentalist development strategies rather than making strategies based on particular 
public values" (Li Youmei et al., 2012：131). As a result, between the government and PSOs 
is a "responsibility for a higher-up system"; and these social organizations are mainly 
responsible to the government as the contract awarding party. 
 
  
86 
 
Attention Allocation: Limited focus on communities  
The "responsibility for higher-up system" affects PSOs with respect to their attention allocation. 
In other words, they tend to concentrate on finding more project resources (Huang Xiaochun 
and Ji Xin, 2014). The first is attention allocation between the government and communities. 
PSOs are concerned more with the top-down contracts that reflect government priorities than 
with bottom-up needs of communities. The second is attention allocation between multiple and 
specific projects. PSOs pay more attention to how to acquire more project funding than 
completing particular projects. The third is attention allocation between the application for and 
execution of projects. PSOs pay more attention to how to win projects and obtain resources 
than how to implement them effectively. 
 
Degree of Embeddedness: Floating above communities.  
The above characteristics of attention allocation would lead PSOs to ‘float above’ 
communities. First, the scope of participation in governance is limited by approval constraints 
on government projects and to the particular fields specified by those projects. Second, 
participation in governance is not active. PSOs are more concerned with obtaining project 
funding and providing services than truly getting involved in CG and addressing community 
concerns. Third, participation is unstable. The state of the relationship between PSOs and 
specific communities is generally not stable and changes with projects awarded funding by 
the government. All the above affect the degree of PSOs participating in CG, bringing about 
difficulties in access to communities and the relationship between multiple stakeholders; as 
well as problems around the accumulation of governance effects, ultimately affecting the level 
of CG. 
Yet while the above logic chain shows the actual state of many PSOs participating in 
CG, not all follow this behaviour: a few have displayed the characteristics of ideal social 
organizations. In recent years in grassroots governance, for example, a number of outstanding 
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PSOs have emerged which, though they might differ from one another in specific forms of 
participation in CG, have one thing in common: they could be clearly defined as public interest-
oriented, rather than behaving purely to acquire resources; stay close to community residents 
and integrate into CG. 
The Environment for CBSOs 
Community Endogeneity: Dependency on community resources  
CBSOs operate in the communities where they originated and remain based, independent of 
external environments. The main way through which CBSOs obtain resources is to mobilize 
through various other organizations and non-official connections among other channels within 
communities: drawing down resources scattered inside communities, including material, 
cultural, human, and other resources. In addition, in recent years, the state has invested large 
resources in urban and rural grassroots communities; but those are intended for use in all 
aspects of communities, with quite limited a proportion of them going to CBSOs. Therefore, 
CBSOs rely more on resources generated from inside communities. 
 
Resource Integration: Difficulties involved  
The endogenous nature of CBSOs affects their ability to draw down resources, with many 
such organizations facing the difficulty of effectively integrating community resources (Gao 
Hong, 2011). First, communities differ from one another in terms of their stock of resources, 
which determines the amount that CBSOs can obtain. Second, different communities have 
different resource composition; the governance capacity of CBSOs is closely associated with 
the degree of complementarity of resources to be integrated. Third, communities may differ in 
their resource integration mechanisms, which mainly include authority-supported vertical 
integration and social capital-supported horizontal integration (Putnam, 2001). Social capital, 
at the core of which are trust, norms and networks, represents a much more common resource 
integration mechanism. 
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Degree of professionality: Weak governance capacity  
The characteristics of resource integration, outlined above, make the capacity of CBSOs 
participating in CG rather weak on the whole. There are several reasons for this. The first is 
the vulnerability of organizations themselves. Community resources have an influence on the 
age and knowledge structures of CBSO employees, as well as their internal governance 
structures. Most CBSOs have a membership of predominantly middle-aged and elderly 
people, a simple knowledge structure, largely inadequate internal governance structures, and 
operate in ways that are neither regularized nor stable.  
The second is the change of resource mobilization. CBSOs' level of governance 
relative to communities’ changes with the state of community resources and mobilization. 
Even in communities with plentiful resources, ability to mobilize these is important, which is 
why most of these social organizations do not have adequate capacity for participating in CG. 
The third is the limited scope of participation. In practice, CBSOs are focused more on 
particular groups of people with shared interests or hobbies – say, entertainment - than getting 
immersed in CG (Li Youmei et al., 2012). 
However, the few exceptions to this include social organizations spontaneously formed 
in recent years in many urban communities: such as parking self-regulation committees that 
have played quite an important role in solving difficulties in parking and engaging residents in 
community consultation; in other words, they have participated in CG effectively. These 
organizations have one common characteristic: they could, with the help of grassroots 
government and autonomous mass organizations, integrate various resources and improve 
their governance abilities. 
Given the above analysis, we still need to answer two questions: in practice, when the 
problem of inadequate matching between social organizations and CG is prevalent, what is 
the relationship between professional organisations, community-based social organizations 
and the state? Why is there only a small number of such ideal social organizations? In order 
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to answer these, the paper examines the response strategies that governments and 
communities adopt as well as the constraints of these. 
 
Response Strategies and their Constraints 
Local governments and autonomous mass grassroots organizations have adopted several 
strategies aimed at dealing with the problem of SD among social organizations participating 
in CG, for related environmental reasons. Given the analytical framework defined earlier, those 
strategies may be understood in two ways: strengthening the embeddedness of PSOs; and 
enhancing the professionality of CBSOs. In practice, achieving embeddedness and 
professionality requires longer–term efforts to be made continuously. 
 
Strengthening the Embeddedness of PSOs 
There are diverse ways through which to strengthen the embeddedness of PSOs. At the core 
here is how to better integrate them into communities. Exploring these issues mainly involves 
three important mechanisms: evaluation, entry, and long-term. 
 
Evaluation mechanisms: Degree of penetration.  
Since PSOs' attention allocation is mainly influenced by the government, when purchasing 
services from these organizations, it could pay attention to evaluation mechanism-building and 
the quality of services. Introducing indicators relating to community embeddedness of PSOs 
could help guide the process of evaluation. Such indicators could include, for example, 
whether PSOs have performed a thorough survey of community needs; whether they have 
sustained regular staff members in communities; and how long and how satisfied the 
organizations and residents within communities are with services that PSOs have provided. 
Entry mechanisms: Relations between neighbourhood committees and PSOs  
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The degree of community embeddedness of professional social organizations is closely 
associated with the extent to which they are supported by autonomous mass grassroots 
organizations: in other words, neighbourhood or village committees. Without positive support 
from these, PSOs’ engagement with urban and rural communities is limited. Local 
governments believe it is important to build good relations between neighbourhood/village 
committees and PSOs: by seeking the former's support and latter’s cooperation, and requiring 
good relations between both. 
 
Long-term mechanisms: Project support  
To enable PSOs to take root in communities providing services and participating in 
governance, some local governments have begun operating long-term service purchase 
projects. This shift from their previous practice of seeking quick results makes it possible to 
maintain relatively stable relations with and continue to accumulate effects in communities. 
Long-term projects allow PSOs to help build CBSOs by, for example, training them in 
professional knowledge, techniques and skills. 
Despite the above explorations by local governments, mature, universal practices have 
yet to emerge. On the evaluation mechanism, the general approach that local governments 
adopt in purchasing services is to have social organizations evaluated by third-party expert 
teams; but this is usually limited to contractual procedures and contents - characteristic of 
technical governance - and often neglects what is most important: whether they address the 
needs of communities and residents. Moreover, pushing these three mechanisms would touch 
on matters dealing with relations between various government departments and related 
systems, making it necessary to carry out reforms. 
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Enhancing the professionality of CBSOs 
Enhancing the professionality of CBSOs involves the interplay of community infrastructure, 
governance structure and external resources. Practical efforts at grassroots level include 
community-building regarding infrastructure, collaboration between communities, social 
organizations and social workers, and knowledge training: all as resources introduced into 
communities. 
 
Infrastructure: Community building  
In the long run, the development of CBSOs is influenced by community infrastructure, and 
community-building represents the fundamental pathway for their development. Community-
building helps increase the stock and optimize the structure of community resources; foster 
community civility, social capital and capacity for self-organization; and integrate community 
resources better for effective use by CBSOs: thereby providing basic support for improving 
the professionality and governance capacity of CBSOs. 
 
Collaboration between communities, social organizations and social workers  
In the medium term, fostering CBSOs with a certain level of professionality through 
collaboration with professional organizations or personnel, training them in professional skills 
and methods for providing services and participating in governance, are also important ways 
of improving the professionality and governance ability of CBSOs. In recent years, many local 
governments have been pushing for collaboration between communities, social organizations 
and social workers, by making moves in this direction. 
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Bringing in resources: Knowledge and training  
In the short run, a method widely adopted by local governments is to introduce different types 
of resources into communities, aimed at addressing specific governance issues: including 
expert lectures and knowledge training programmes to help CBSOs acquire skills in technical 
methods, governance structures and operational mechanisms typical of PSOs; as well as 
knowledge about scheme designing, activity planning, collaboration on governance, rules 
making, project application and dispute settlement. 
Yet these explorations need to take account of the time it takes for new practices to 
take hold. Long, medium and short-term impacts on the professionality of CBSOs happen in 
descending order, and are costs to be incurred for them. It follows naturally that short-term 
resource input may have some impact, but does not work effectively to improve capabilities. 
 
Limitations and Way Out 
The foregoing experiments by local governments and autonomous mass organizations at 
grassroots level have yet to change the basic environment of SD among social organizations 
participating in CG. This illustrates that the existing explorations have their limitations. On the 
one hand, institutional arrangements involved in existing explorations are still far from perfect; 
on the other, these are mainly focused on the incentive and constraint roles of resources 
relative to social organizations, without considering the more important guiding role of culture. 
In other words, although resource dependence is the central mechanism contributing to SD, 
simply regulating the roles of the resource incentive and constraint mechanism is not enough 
to bring about changes in the state of SD. In the long run, to solve the problem of matching 
social organizations and CG hinges on culture-building centred on public consciousness. 
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Discussion and Conclusion 
This article has looked into the relationship of social organizations to CG: taking as its point of 
departure the rapid development of social organizations versus the limited effects of their 
participating in CG. By building a theoretical framework that comprises "external environment, 
supply-demand matching, and governance level”, this article has explored the fit between 
demand-side CG and supply-side social organizations; and pointed to the limited effects of 
social organization participating in CG.  
The article identified the lack of fit between supply and demand as critical; social 
organizations fail to satisfy what communities demand. On this basis, it examined the 
environmental factors which may be causing this inadequate match, as well as investigating 
possible ways of addressing this. Unlike previous studies, this article put social organizations 
in a dual environment consisting of government and communities; and examined mechanisms 
for correlation while unveiling the problem of SD among social organizations. 
This study arrived at the following five conclusions. First, embeddedness and 
professionality are two basic requirements that CG has for social organizations. The limited 
effects of social organizations participating in CG suggest that they cannot satisfy the two 
basic requirements. Second, the top-down government and bottom-up community form the 
dual environment for social organizations participating in CG, becoming the key factor 
influencing the matching between them. Third, the dual environment affects the organizational 
character and behavioural logic of various types of social organizations (especially of 
professional and community-based ones), to the extent that SD arises among social 
organizations participating in CG; an environment where floating PSOs, weak CBSOs, a few 
ideal and other types of social organizations co-exist.  
Fourth, resource reliance is the core mechanism through which the external 
environment-shaping social organizations participate in CG. Specifically, PSOs rely heavily on 
government resources; through agenda setting, this causes them to often float above 
communities. On the other hand, CBSOs rely heavily on community resources: through 
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resource integration, this usually renders them quite weak. Fifth, strengthening the 
embeddedness of PSOs and enhancing the professionality of CBSOs is possible. Strategies 
for this have been identified, especially as this exploration helps us better understand the 
constraints of grassroots governance. 
 
Notes 
‘Embeddedness’ is a classic concept in the sphere of sociology, with diverse meanings and 
usages (Liu Shiding, 2015). This article uses this concept in the sense of Granovetter (1985), 
to stress the degree to which social organizations are integrated into the internal networks of 
communities. 
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4. Pushing the Boundaries: Exploring the action space of an NGO in the context of 
devolution in urban China 
  
Liang Chen 
 
Abstract: In recent years, governance reforms in China have resulted in significant changes 
in the role of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). To provide further insight into this 
shift, this paper presents a case study of a social organization in a city in Southern Jiangsu. 
Drawing on a qualitative research methodology, the following discussion explores how 
emerging forms of new governance have expanded NGOs’ space for action and given them 
increased autonomy in the prevailing institutional environment. It also describes the respective 
action spaces and characteristics of local government. These two strands of the research are 
synthesized in order to provide new insights into the reshaping of the boundaries between 
NGOs and the local state. The findings show how, in a government-dominated institutional 
environment, devolution of power has certain positive impacts on the development of NGOs. 
 
Keywords: NGO; Action Space; Boundaries, Devolution, Governance 
 
Introduction 
In recent years, in the wake of the 18th and 19th CPC Central Committees’ reforms on ‘social 
governance’, the role of NGOs has developed rapidly in China. The reforms entail a process 
of ‘devolution’ – or the transfer of power from central to subordinate tiers of government - as 
well as other sectors, including the voluntary one, which incorporates community groups. 
Under this scenario, government plays a guiding role, encouraging and supporting all sectors 
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of society to participate in governance; rather than have an exclusive reliance on state 
provision.  
In consequence, NGOs’ development and their evolving relationship with the 
government has attracted the attention of many scholars. Existing analysis tells us there are 
three principal developmental forms of NGOs in China. The first is when government directly 
delegates part of its public management function to NGOs. The second is when the state 
transfers market space to non-profit organizations. In such cases, grassroots organizations 
will emerge. Such a process is closely related to the degree to which a market economy has 
developed in a specific locale. The third is when government follows market trends, directs 
and promotes the formation of social autonomy (Jia Xijin, 2003). From a comparative 
perspective, the first form is most important in the early stages of the development of an NGO. 
This is especially true in areas where state institutions are traditionally powerful in welfare and 
service delivery. In such localities, in the wake of reforms introduced by central government, 
it is common for it to directly participate in, foster, lead and promote the development of NGOs. 
The most likely consequence is that, in contrast to the changing roles of NGOs seen in 
Western societies given the rise of welfare pluralism, they take a distinctive developmental 
route: outlined in the following discussion. 
 Some earlier studies have explored the strategic behaviour of NGOs in the context 
of governance reform in the PRC (Wang Xinxian, 2006). Notably, a leading examination 
underlined the need to analyse the action strategies of NGOs, including their “informal politics” 
(Zhang Jingen, Zhuang Wenjia, 2008). Such works have enhanced contemporary 
understanding, not least because they explain key changes in the interaction between 
government and NGOs. Here, it should be remembered that the government has different 
ways of managing and supporting different NGOs. For example, there are government 
organized non-governmental organizations (GONGOs), as well as grassroots NGOs. The 
latter have different action strategies and influences compared to GONGOs. As White (1993) 
points out, GONGOS obtain actual influence with government by sacrificing aspects of their 
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autonomy. Compared to grassroots NGOs, they are more closely aligned with government’s 
agenda.  
However, other scholars have taken a contrasting view. Lu Yiyi (2007) for example, 
believes that GONGOS do have “actual autonomy” – although their close association with the 
state may suggest otherwise. This brings with certain advantages - for when they are 
‘embedded’ in government agencies, they can play a key role in mobilizing resources and 
achieving their organizational goals. 
 These earlier studies describe the relationship between government and NGOs. 
Adopting contrasting viewpoints, they variously describe how NGOs exist independently of the 
government; or emphasize that they are attached to the government, as a result of the 
administration’s infiltration into society. Notably, Huang Xiaochun and Yan Xin (2014) apply 
the theoretical framework of “non-synergetic governance – strategic response” in order to 
better understand governance transformation in contemporary China. Specifically, they 
examine the impact of the government’s ‘governance logic’ on NGOs in the context of a post-
reform diversified institutional environment.  
However, notwithstanding these earlier studies, a key lacuna is the lack of discussion 
about the space and boundaries of actions between the government and NGOs. The following 
discussion seeks to address this knowledge gap and explores the characteristics of NGOs’ 
action space, boundaries and degrees of autonomy.  
 
 The following analysis is a case study of the Chengnan Social Work Service Centre in 
one city in Southern Jiangsu, China. We examine the institutional environment in this locality 
and explore the NGO’s coping strategies, in order to analyse how it interacts with governments 
at various levels, seeks to expand its action space, and acquires autonomy. Based on this, 
the paper then discusses the wider situation, in terms of the characteristics, action space and 
boundaries between governments and NGOs.  
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The social work service agency examined in this case study is only one of the many 
types of NGOs established under the leadership of local government, supported and funded 
by the state. Such NGOs are more commonly found in the institutional environment of ‘strong 
government’. In order to ensure effective welfare delivery, local government needs to nurture 
and incubate these NGOs. However, as the following discussion reveals, due to their 
dependency on government funding and resources, their ability to access resources in the 
marketplace is limited; most of their services are needed and bought by local government 
 To explore these issues further, the remainder of this paper is structured thusly: 
following an outline of the research methodology, the discussion has three sections. First, 
attention centres on the research context (‘Devolution and its impact on the Action Space of 
NGOs’), sub-divided to consider the challenges of devolved governance, space conflicts and 
boundary establishment. Subsequently, the case study findings are presented (‘Testing the 
Boundaries: Exploring the actions of Chengnan social work service centre’). Again, the 
discussion is comprised of two parts: ‘Multiple Logics and the Demands of Various 
Government Departments’; and ‘Expanding NGOs’ Action Space and Increasing Autonomy 
Through Testing and Gaming’. Lastly, attention focuses on the boundaries and autonomy 
formed in the process of testing. The concluding section reflects on how the case study 
findings advance understandings of the emerging forms of governance in contemporary 
China.  
 
Methodology 
This paper takes Chengnan Social Workers Service Centre as a case study. It uses in-depth 
interviews and participatory observation methods to conduct case analysis. The data include 
interviews with and working logs of staff at Chengnan Social Work Service Centre, as well as 
local government and community residents’ committees. 
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 The reason this case study was chosen is that is typical. Chengnan Social Worker 
Service Centre is a non-governmental organization established by the help of government, 
because of the perceived need for this service by the state. Yet it has nonetheless gained 
autonomy despite a strong government environment. 
 
Devolution and its Impact on the Action Space of NGOs 
The Challenges of Devolved Governance 
The case study city (anonymized for reasons of participant confidentiality) is a county-level 
city in Southern Jiangsu. In the 1990s, with the rapid development of township and village 
enterprises, it became representative of the ‘Sunan Model’: which refers to how Suzhou, Wuxi 
and Changzhou, all in southern Jiangsu, realized non-agricultural development by evolving 
township and village enterprises. In the mid-1990s, most township and village enterprises took 
advantage of their location in the Yangtze River Delta region to attract investment and secure 
a transformation away from a state monopoly to a mixed economy: including private 
enterprises, foreign-owned businesses, and new state-owned enterprises. Progress was 
rapid; the city’s economic development was among the top 100 in China (Saidi Consultants, 
County Economic Research Center, 2019).  
In the past three decades, the municipal government has played an active role in the 
urban development process. Notably, in the face of problems arising amid marketization, it 
has implemented a series of administrative actions, such as urban-rural integration, 
equalization of public services, and merging townships into larger urban conurbations. 
However, in many respects, the impact of these state interventions has been to undermine 
social capital and the autonomy of local communities (Wang Chunguang, 2013). In short, the 
interventionist nature of government has weakened social bonds and the autonomy and self-
management ability of social communities. It has also blurred the boundaries, with increased 
tensions, friction and conflict between the government and society.  
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 In 2011 and 2012, our case study city planned to extend its southern suburbs into 
a new district of science, education, culture and healthcare. Therefore, the government carried 
out large-scale land acquisition and demolition of farming households in the area. In order to 
complete the demolition task quickly, the newly established Chengnan Town Government 
promised to pay the property management fee for the residents who were relocated, while 
simultaneously increasing the demolition efforts. As a result, the town government has to 
spend about 10 million Yuan on the property management fee each year: which not only added 
a financial burden, but also blurred the boundary of responsibility between it and residents, 
and directly led to the challenges faced by what, for reasons of anonymity, we shall call 
‘Community B’: newly established after land acquisition and demolition. 
 As the first urban community in Chengnan Town, Community B was formally 
established at the end of 2012. It covers an area of 1.16 million square metres. It is expected 
to accommodate a total population of 10,000; currently, around 4,000 people have settled 
there. It is a typical resettlement community; most residents are former farmers. Its layout is 
comprised of three relocation resettlement areas and four commercial residential areas. At 
present, the occupancy rate of commercial residential areas is low, while the relocated farmers 
account for 81% of the total population.  
The tensions arising from the rapid land acquisition and demolition are directly reflected 
in the relationship between the relocated residents living in concentrated communities and the 
community neighbourhood committees (Juweihui). In the eyes of residents, the 
neighbourhood committee represents the government. The whole process of land acquisition, 
demolition and relocation has been led by the government. Therefore, if the residents 
encounter any problems, they go to the neighbourhood committee for help.  
One of the most prominent issues is use of the community club. Newly relocated 
residents are still used to following rural customs at weddings and funerals. There are often 
conflicts about using the club for weddings or funerals, which require the neighbourhood 
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committee to mediate: as evidenced in the following comments by the former director of the 
Community B’s Residents Committee: 
The biggest problems are weddings and funerals. Any family who wants to hold a 
wedding will make an appointment with the club several months in advance. But for 
funerals, there is no way to make an appointment in advance. If a funeral happens to 
be on the same day as a wedding ceremony, there will be a conflict. In fact, the town 
government has transformed an old factory into a place for funerals, but people are 
picky, thinking it is too far away and inconvenient for relatives and friends to go there. 
It is very noisy to hold funerals at the club. We encourage civilized funeral customs. 
But residents don’t want to lose face and insist on holding funerals at the club. Every 
time there is a conflict of this type, they make trouble in my office. One day, some 
residents even carried a coffin to the office of the neighbourhood committee, asking 
why we didn’t build two clubs. They came in the evening, and I was scared to death. 
Once some people came and damaged my office. (Interview with Ms. L, former director 
of the Community B’s Residents Committee, number FTLJ20130108). 
 
 The cadres of the neighbourhood committee are considered a part of government by 
the inhabitants; but are not so legally. They felt very aggrieved. They believed that they and 
the residents did not understand each other. Moreover, the tensions gradually deepened 
because the villagers, who as a result of the development programme found their status 
transformed overnight from farmers to urban residents, were low-educated and not grateful. 
At that time, residents’ attitude to the neighbourhood committee was to regard it more like a 
subordinate institution of the government. For this reason, it could not achieve its goal of 
boosting local decision-making and advancing resident autonomy.  
 At the same time, the city’s government also made efforts to adjust its role, devolve 
some power and space to enable NGOs to operate more independently and solve problems 
on their own. Thus, reflecting the Western literature on ‘new’ governance and state steering 
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(Rhodes, 1997; Stoker, 1998), the city government’s functions have gradually changed from 
being the principal governing ‘actor’ to directing, supervising and assuring NGOs and other 
organizations as they participate in local governance and complement the work of the state. 
Officials aim to complete a role transition from ‘player’ to ‘referee’, thereby avoiding direct 
participation in all specific matters. They hope to formulate strategies, develop plans, conduct 
supervision and coordination, and provide service and support. They also expect to play a role 
as an ‘arbitrator’ and maintain their neutral authority.  
In 2008, the city’s Civil Affairs Bureau took the lead in implementing the social 
management system reform of “interaction of government and society” and “joint operation of 
communities, NGOs, and social workers”, a local government innovation. Accordingly, it tried 
to delegate power and action space by emphasizing cooperation between local government 
and social forces, including social workers and NGOs; promoting social autonomy and 
fostering self-organization to reverse the government-dominated situation in China over the 
previous several decades.  
However, this ambitious transformation of the mode of governance has encountered 
various difficulties. The government “cannot find ‘society’”. This refers to the comparatively 
small number and undeveloped nature of NGOs in the city. For example, in 2011, apart from 
privately-owned non-enterprises and foundations, there were just 175 NGOs, the fastest 
growing of which were industry associations and academic societies. The former reflected the 
demands of enterprises; the latter were administrative. Both were largely unsuited to playing 
a role in social building and service delivery in the local urban development programme.  
Among the social service organizations, educational organizations registered as 
private non-enterprises were in the majority. Most of these were engaged in education or 
vocational training for children of migrant workers. But NGOs, such as social service and 
charitable organizations, were rare, with professional social work organizations even scarcer. 
In 2012, the city had 80 qualified social workers, but most were staff members from community 
neighbourhood committees and sub-district offices. The only professional social work 
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organization was a social work agency established with the assistance of a social work teacher 
at a local university in 2011.  
In the original design for “coordination of communities, NGOs, and social workers”, it 
was intended that the three parties would cooperate and undertake joint actions. However, 
community organizations often struggle to find skilled NGOs and professional social workers 
to undertake work in their area. Instead, they resort to community neighbourhood committees 
for help. Thus, the ‘government-society interaction’ is mainly between the government and 
community neighbourhood committees. However, neighbourhood committees are more like 
agencies affiliated to the government which undertake many administrative functions. For this 
reason, they cannot truly be regarded as the representative body of local society. 
 The second difficulty is ‘social immobility’. In the early stages of the ‘government-
society interaction’ and ‘joint operation of communities, NGOs, and social workers’ reforms, 
the staff of the Civil Affairs Bureau complained that “society is not moving”; and “no matter 
how hard you try, the society does not move”. The problem is one of limited capacity to engage 
and participate. This is compounded by the historical absence of engagement. Put simply, 
communities lack the tradition of social self-organization and engaging with those in power. In 
the absence of NGOs and professional social workers, the government regards community 
neighbourhood committees as a representative of society, but it is very difficult for them to 
step up and engage with the state because of lack of social capital, capabilities and trust in 
communities.  
The community neighbourhood committees could not galvanize community residents 
to participate in self-governance. This ‘social immobility’ – or inability of NGOs to fully engage 
with the local authorities as hoped for in the joint operation of communities, NGOs, and social 
workers reforms - greatly troubled the city government. It was trying hard to change its 
traditional mode of working and delegate power and action space, but could not find suitable 
NGOs to engage with. In consequence, local government officials were eager to cultivate 
NGOs, especially social work service organizations, to undertake service projects which could 
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meet the aims of central government’s governance reforms, encourage social participation, 
and contribute to resolving the prevailing social problems. 
 
Space conflicts and boundary establishment 
A team from a research institute came to the city to study the local situation during this period. 
The institute has an extended history of undertaking social research there. After learning about 
the situation of Community B and the ‘participation deficit’, they offered to assist officials, set 
up a social work organization and provide community services for Chengnan Town 
Government based on demand orientation and capacity-building. The city’s government and 
Civil Affairs Bureau were pleased to accept the offer. The research team acted as a go-
between, and the city government and Civil Affairs Bureau invited a professional social work 
organization from another province to undertake a thorough investigation, recruit and train 
local social workers.  
In June 2014, following these negotiations and efforts, the Chengnan Social Work 
Service Centre was formally established. It mainly focuses on community-building for 
Community B and is funded by the purchase project of the Chengnan Town Government (with 
the budget preliminarily set at 120,000 Yuan per year). In addition, the local government has 
reserved part of the budget for funding bids from community self-organizations (including 
mutual aid and community service organizations). 
 Chengnan Social Work Service Center serves all residents of Community B. Its main 
objectives are to satisfy the needs of residents, provide services, cultivate self-governance 
capabilities, and alleviate the conflict between residents and local government. The law 
stipulates that the community neighbourhood committee is a self-governing organization, 
responsible for self-management and services to residents. However, Community B’s 
neighbourhood committee, like most equivalents, puts most of its energy into the work 
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assigned by local government. Thus, it is more like a quasi-government department. It does 
not have much capacity to play the role of a self-governing community organization.   
Our analysis shows how Chengnan Social Work Service Center has complemented 
the work of the community neighbourhood committee and secured a more autonomous space 
for action, in furtherance of the government's expectation of alleviating social conflicts. As a 
professional social work organization, it has different working methods from neighbourhood 
committees. It focuses on demand orientation and capacity-building. It also emphasizes the 
professionalism of social work.  
In definitional terms, ‘demand orientation’ emphasizes changing the old way of top-
down decision-making and resource allocation, shifting to the actual needs of the public, 
guiding and supporting communities to participate in decision-making and deliver services to 
local people. ‘Capacity-building’ places emphasis on enabling NGOs, communities and 
residents to acquire the skills and resources to manage themselves. Although some staff 
members of neighbourhood committees in the city have passed social work qualifications, 
their committee work limits their ability to undertake social work; so instead, they are principally 
focused on community building and social activities.  
In contrast, Chengnan Social Work Service Centre emphasizes the professionalism of 
social work. Their goal is to cultivate an independent, localized team of professional social 
work talent, develop a series of local adaptive and effective community work methods, and 
establish a set of deliverable, replicable community work practices. Its two goals have been 
recognized by the municipal government and the Civil Affairs Bureau. This official recognition 
has given it a lot of space for action; including acting as an independent NGO and encouraging 
social participation to alleviate social conflicts.  
However, the main priority of Chengnan Town Government remains land acquisition, 
demolition and economic development. Due to the need to maintain social stability, the 
government has placed certain restrictions on the Centre’s work; it fears that the actions of an 
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independent NGO will cause more dissatisfaction among the population. This has had a 
negative impact on its ability to achieve its goals and expand its action space.  
From this, we can see that by cultivating the professional Chengnan Social Work 
Service Centre, the municipal government has effectively transferred the community service 
and self-governance functions originally belonging to the community neighbourhood 
committee to it. The underlying motive is to encourage social participation and alleviate social 
tensions. However, the Centre, predicated on meeting the actual needs of the city’s 
government, has inherent limitations in its independence and autonomy. Its action space is 
also restricted by different levels of government, as discussed below. Nevertheless, the 
prevailing political will from the local authorities mean it is likely to achieve greater autonomy, 
independence and greater space for action over time. 
 
Testing the Boundaries: Exploring the actions of Chengnan Social Work Service Centre 
Multiple logic and the demands of various government departments 
In the wake of the 18th and 19th CPC Central Committees’ reforms on ‘social 
governance’, some scholars have pointed out that the Chinese government structure has two 
important characteristics. One is horizontal and refers to the authority and interest conflicts 
between departments. The other is vertical, reflecting multi-level governance structures. This 
complex, special government configuration also provides a context for the operation of NGOs 
(Ji Yingying, 2013). In this regard, Huang Xiaochun and Ji Xin (2014) used the concept of 
“non-synergetic governance” to offer more detailed analysis of the institutional logics of 
‘vertical’, ‘horizon’ and public liaison departments towards public service NGOs.  
The institutional logic of vertical departments tends to shape the autonomy of these 
organizations based on government objectives and fact-oriented characteristics: so much so 
that they are concerned about whether the government's goals have been achieved. The 
target governance logic of ‘horizon’ departments tends to shape the autonomy of these 
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organizations based on regional demands; whereas the unique preference of public liaison 
departments means they are more inclined to shape the autonomy of these organizations 
based on the “mainstream symbol” production process, which means they are more 
concerned about ‘political correctness’.  
Given the different demands and institutional logic between government agencies at 
different levels and in different departments, government agencies have different attitudes and 
approaches to engaging NGOs. In this case, Chengnan Social Service Centre must test the 
boundary between itself and government, including across different governance levels and 
departments. 
Against this backdrop the city government expects professional social work teams to 
use new methods in solving the current community tensions, arising from mistrust between 
community neighbourhood committee and residents. There are two main motivations for local 
government to innovate in social governance: one is that it hopes to highlight this action in 
their political achievements; the other is it is forced to solve real problems through innovative 
methods. The two motivations are reflected in the action logic of the city government: which 
addresses its lag in economic competition compared with neighbouring cities.  
At the same time, social issues arising from rapid land acquisition and demolition in 
Community B cannot be effectively resolved with past methods. Therefore, the city 
government's support for the Chengnan Social Work Service Centre is a pragmatic response 
to promoting development and meeting the aims of the ‘social governance’ reforms. 
 The City’s Civil Affairs Bureau is a fact-oriented ‘vertical’ department which also 
supports the Social Work Service Centre. Its efforts in 2008, when it sought to introduce new 
practices aligned with the ‘government-society interaction’ and ‘joint operation of communities, 
NGOs and social workers’ reforms, were hampered because the number of social workers 
and NGOs was too small to enable interaction with the government. Without this, innovative 
practice could not be carried out effectively.  
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Thus, the Bureau and its subordinate Social Organization Service Centre set up the 
Chengnan Social Work Service Centre and hoped that it would fully exert its role in innovative 
practice. The main task of the Centre is to incubate and nurture NGOs. Since 2012, it has 
invested 2 million Yuan each year to support NGOs in carrying out projects and increase the 
numbers of their employees. It has also set up an incubator base to provide free workplaces 
and invited experts from Shanghai and elsewhere to offer professional training and lectures. 
With their efforts, the number of NGOs in the city has increased significantly: from 180 in 2011 
to 807 in 2016. The number of NGOs per 10,000 people has reached 11.23. In a short space 
of time, an NGO system – spanning a full range of functional types, organizational size and 
coverage - has been established.  
NGOs such as Chengnan Social Work Service Centre, which has professional 
capabilities and enjoyed fixed funding support during the start-up phase, are most likely to be 
‘incubated’ successfully. These developments prove that appropriate investment of resources 
into the Social Organization Service Centre has achieved good results, given it has attained 
more financial resources and more staff. 
 As for Chengnan Town Government, as a basic level ‘horizontal’ department, its 
demands and logic are different from those of the municipal government and civil affairs 
bureau. Social stability is the foremost priority. Assessing progress against this objective 
requires unanimous citizen support. Should even one local resident express dissatisfaction, 
the town government may be deemed to have failed. For it, unfamiliar social work methods 
may bring risks and must be treated with caution.  
The city government oversees a project in Community B of Chengnan Town. It regards 
it as a task assigned by its superiors. For this reason, it can guarantee purchase funds and 
offer financial support, but it holds a wait-and-see attitude towards social work concepts and 
methods, along with the Chengnan Social Work Service Centre itself. Chengnan Town now 
has five departments following the institutional reform: Economic Development; Planning and 
Construction; Investment Promotion; Human Resources and Social Security; and Civil Affairs. 
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The latter, with seven staff members, is responsible for civil affairs, family planning, disabled 
people, culture, education, sport, judicial administration, comprehensive management, 
complaint letters and visits, market supervision, health and stability. The Director of the Civil 
Affairs Bureau of Chengnan Town explained the current challenges: 
There are only seven staff members in our Civil Affairs Bureau, but we have to do so 
much work. To be honest, our major efforts are put in comprehensive administration, 
maintaining stability maintaining and handling social issues and disputes. At present, 
many conflicts arise due to our limited capacity and lots of historical issues. The 
pressure of maintaining stability is particularly huge. The priorities of Chengnan Town 
government focus on investment, construction, as well as land acquisition and 
demolition. We definitely need NGOs to help us, but we cannot spare our time in 
building and supporting NGOs...” (Interview with Ding, Director of Civil Affairs Bureau 
of Chengnan Town, No. FTCJ20150916). 
 The importance of land acquisition and demolition means that Chengnan Town puts 
economic development and social stability at the forefront of its priorities. It adopts an 
expedient approach; its core goal is a working method that can quickly achieve results and 
bring about community unity and stability. 
 
 The recently established neighbourhood committee of Community B is also unsure 
about the actions of the Social Work Service Centre. As in Chengnan Town, in the new 
resettlement community for residents relocated due to building demolition, ensuring social 
stability is the first task that the town government requires the neighbourhood committee to 
undertake. However, previous data shows that local people regard the neighbourhood 
committee as a “representative of the government”. This has made its work harder: it has felt 
tremendous pressure when directly providing services to residents. In the face of dual 
pressures, the neighbourhood committee is very nervous about any changes in the 
community. It is also sceptical about the social workers who want to mobilize residents. 
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Furthermore, it worries that they may antagonize residents and undermine the community’s 
stability. 
 Due to their different institutional logic and demands, different levels of government 
departments have different views on the Social Work Service Centre. Since it began its work, 
it has tested different action strategies, and gradually found different means of expanding its 
action space and securing greater autonomy. 
 
Expanding NGOs’ Action Space and Increasing Autonomy through Pushing the 
Boundaries 
From the outset, the Social Work Service Centre wanted to recruit volunteers in the community 
in order to mobilize residents to participate and promote it. Its method was to recruit volunteers 
next to the major road in the community. However, Community B’s neighbourhood committee 
opposed this idea. Ms. L, the then director of the committee, believed that it might cause “some 
troublemakers” to create chaos.  
However, social workers went ahead with their plan and started their recruitment next 
to the main road between 4:30 and 7:30 pm: the main commuter time, with residents returning 
from work. The social workers introduced themselves and the Centre to those passing by. 
Residents’ enthusiasm for participation greatly exceeded the expectations of the social 
workers. On the first day, more than 30 volunteers were recruited, including English teachers, 
kindergarten teachers, Latin dance teachers, professionals engaged in fire control and private 
business owners who were willing to sponsor charitable activities. One female resident said, 
"Our residents are kind and caring, but no one is going to organize us".  
The social workers were moved. After several recruitment drives, not only had the 
number of community volunteers increased, but also the popularity of the Centre. At the same 
time, the community neighbourhood committees gained a deeper understanding of the work 
and working methods of the Centre. The recruitment was the first formal interaction between 
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it and residents. It showed residents its employees’ professionalism as social workers; and 
formed a preliminary understanding of existing resources and current needs among the 
community. It was its first test with Community B’s neighbourhood committee. The Centre 
successfully demonstrated its ability to adopt effective working methods to the committee. This 
led the committee to overcome its earlier doubts and accept the Centre’s work.  
 The Centre’s second test involved whether it could organize large-scale activities in 
the community. It designed three tasks: starting and supporting new community social 
organizations; organizing large-scale community activities; and community lectures. However, 
for the sake of security and stability, Director L strongly opposed “organizing large-scale 
community activities”, because of concerns that crowds could make trouble. Director L poured 
out her grievances, as the following interview extract reveals:  
 
Before the age of 30, I was well regarded. But since I became the director of 
Community B’s Neighbourhood Committee, I have suffered abuse on several 
occasions. I really dared not to engage in any large-scale activities. I was afraid that 
there would be residents who would make trouble. Our neighbourhood committee was 
almost in trouble when it was unveiled. 
 
 Under pressure from government to ensure that “stability prevails over everything” and 
fulfil its territorial management responsibilities, the Community Neighbourhood Committee is 
ultimately responsible if residents vent their dissatisfaction about large-scale community 
activities. This explains its cautious attitude toward community residents and activities. 
However, the social workers resisted the pressure and persuaded Director L to hold a Lantern 
Festival party in response to demands from the residents. They even promised they would be 
responsible for any emergency. After consultations between the two parties, the party, jointly 
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organized by recruited resident volunteers and community activists, was held successfully in 
the Neighbourhood Committee hall.  
On the day, Director L insisted that the police were invited to maintain order. This was 
resolutely opposed by social workers. During the party, the ‘chaos’ that Director L feared did 
not materialize, which was quite reassuring for the Committee. After that, the Social Work 
Service Centre successfully planned several large-scale activities, such as the Women’s Joy 
Club, May Grand Party and a Summer Carnival - all within the space of a year. The venue 
gradually changed from indoors to outdoors, attracting more residents to participate. 
Residents carefully prepared for their performance, and even gave improvisational shows on 
stage. The successful activities have made the atmosphere of Community B much better; the 
number of community volunteers has also increased. Some self-organized interest 
communities, such as knitting club and community dance groups, have also been established.  
The active Community B has been envied by the residents of nearby communities. The 
work of Chengnan Social Work Service Centre has been approved by residents and the 
Neighbourhood Committee, and has gradually broken through the restrictions initially imposed 
on it. It has kept the Committee’s bottom line firmly in mind: as long as the stability of the 
community can be maintained, the Committee welcomes the work, including resident 
participation and capacity-building. To this end, it is willing to make certain compromises to 
ensure the activities are a success. 
 
 The Social Work Service Centre changed the attitude of the cadres of Community B’s 
Neighbourhood Committee through practical action. By these means, it won praise and 
support. However, it did not obtain full understanding and support from Chengnan Town 
Government. Chiefs and social workers of the Service Centre engaged with the town 
government by drawing on different logic and responding to the diverse demands of different 
government departments. The result was an expansion of the Centre’s action space and 
resilience. 
115 
 
 First, the Centre needed to obtain independent power to hire from the town 
government. As it is a service project funded by the government, the social workers' salaries 
were also paid by it. The government hoped that newly recruited social workers would directly 
become cadres of the Neighbourhood Committee after training. Yet those in charge of the 
social work agency responsible for the recruitment and training of social workers were firmly 
opposed to this. They believed that social workers can maintain objectivity and 
professionalism as a third party only by maintaining a status as employees of the Service 
Centre; and hence, that social work institutions must have independent personnel rights.  
To make her case, the chief of the provincial social work organization called on 
research team members to try and convince the city government and the Civil Affairs Bureau. 
She also sought support from the city’s Deputy Mayor. In the end, the Centre retained its 
independent personnel rights. After training, the newly recruited social workers became 
professional employees. 
 This hard-won autonomy has laid the foundation for the independence of the Centre. 
This is also reflected in its decision-making regarding day-to-day operational matters. In the 
eyes of Director J, responsible for social undertakings in the Chengnan Town Government, 
the Centre’s main job is to “organize activities and parties” in the community, in order to enrich 
the cultural and entertainment life of residents.  
From the perspective of maintaining social stability, the government does not want the 
Centre to independently conduct operations in other fields without its control: especially the 
introduction of participation and governance initiatives in community self-organization. At the 
end of 2014, residents proposed a voluntary patrol in the community. Under the guidance and 
organization of social workers, Community B’s voluntary mutual-aid team was established. 
The team consists of more than 10 resident patrols in the community every evening. Broken 
public facilities are recorded and reported to relevant departments, with a watchful eye 
maintained on public spaces. Later, when they patrol, the team also visit older residents who 
live alone in the community.  
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The work of the voluntary mutual-aid team has shown the town government the 
effectiveness of bottom-up communication channels, and the mutual benefits for residents. 
Thus, the government has obtained a new understanding of the governance-oriented self-
organization of residents; in turn, this has changed its attitude from earlier doubts to support 
and assistance. 
 Through this interaction with Community B’s Neighbourhood Committee and the 
town government, the working methods and abilities of Chengnan Social Work Service Centre 
have been recognized and praised as “a reassuring organization” by local government. As a 
result, the Centre has gained more independence and resources, so it can successfully 
organize large-scale community activities and assist residents in establishing governance-
oriented community self-organization. Its service scope has extended to three further urban 
communities in Chengnan Town; as well as beyond it to the whole city, which has had a 
significant impact on the city government. 
 With the Centre now promoted by the Social Organization Service Centre under the 
Civil Affairs Bureau, both Chengguan Town and Liuhu Town have expressed their desire to 
purchase its services. The former is the old town, with crowded communities and a mixed 
population. Its demands are increasingly diversified. Given a dearth of effective community 
services, the Chengguan Town Government hopes that the Centre can provide guidance on 
professional social work methods for its neighbourhood committees; and offer NGO start-up 
and training services organized by communities.  
In 2016, Liuhu Town established ‘Neighbourhood Homes’ in each community. It 
purchased professional services from the Centre in order to maintain daily operations. The 
basic-level government, as a ‘horizon’ department, tends to control the activities of these 
organizations and does not want them to develop their business across regions. Service-
oriented NGOs contracted by basic-level governments will try their best to maintain good 
relations with them and complete tasks according to their requirements. However, Chengnan 
Social Work Service Centre breaks the geographical constraints. It has extended its service 
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out of Chengnan Town to our case study city and beyond: to Suzhou, which enables it to 
acquire more resources and space for action. 
 Under the influence of the Centre, the city government has attached more importance 
to social work. In 2012, there were only 80 qualified social workers. Most were staff members 
of neighbourhood committees and sub-district offices. There was only one organization of 
professional social workers. After 2014, the number of professional social workers in the city 
increased significantly. Outstanding talents in the social work profession have also received 
subsidies of more than 100,000 Yuan. The policy has attracted over 40 people to work in the 
city and establish new social work organizations, including those with postgraduate training 
(such as a Master’s degree in Social Work and Doctorate in other related disciplines, such as 
Sociology and Social Policy). In addition, the city government has also intensified its training 
of local recruits. From 2015 onwards, local students enrolled on a social work major course 
were rewarded with 10,000 Yuan per year. In 2015, 10 undergraduate students in the city 
chose to take a social work major, with the number increasing again the following year. 
 Some scholars believe that the autonomy of NGOs can be understood as having three 
components: the extent to which they can decide the scope of the services they provide; 
determine the geographical scope of their organizational activities; and decide their internal 
operating processes (Huang Xiaochun, Ji Xin, 2014). Chengnan Social Work Service Centre 
has obtained independent power to hire through its negotiation with the town government. It 
can make independent decisions in personnel recruitment, deployment and management. Its 
service scope has expanded to other towns and communities in the city and beyond. It has 
also obtained support from the Red Cross and the Disabled Persons' Federation. 
 The Centre, then, has won the trust of government at all levels and expanded its space 
for action. It has transformed from an organization that resolves community conflicts and 
organizes community activities under the supervision of the Neighbourhood Committee and 
the town government into one that independently chooses working methods and determines 
the scope of its operations. Its work has extended from Community B to other communities in 
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the city and beyond. Its working methods have also been transformed; from offering services 
to actively influencing neighbourhood committees and the town government. It even urged the 
municipal government to pay attention to social work and relevant human resources. It has 
been testing current policy, changing behaviours, and reshaping inter-organisational 
boundaries as a result of its interaction with government at all levels.  
 
The boundaries and autonomy formed in the process of ‘boundary pushing’ 
The foregoing discussion illustrates how NGOs, as third sector organizations, differ from 
government organizations (GOs) in terms of remit and mode of operation. Both have fixed 
aims, thereby establishing the boundary between NGOs and GOs. However, this may change 
as a result of interaction between the two sides; in some cases, it is even reshaped. 
 This process can be explained as follows. First, a boundary emerges in the interaction 
between NGOs and GOs of different levels. In our case study, the city government was a fine 
example of an assertive government with wide-ranging responsibilities; yet lacking awareness 
of action boundaries and self-restraining action space. After realizing its limitations, the city 
government fostered Chengnan Social Work Service Centre. Its interaction with it allowed it 
to develop an awareness of the boundary between GOs and NGOs, creating more space of 
action for the latter.  
 Second, the GO-NGO boundary is dynamic: flexible and ever-changing during 
interaction between the two sides. In this case, at first, the Community B Neighbourhood 
Committee had been wary of the Service Centre. It is imperative for it to maintain stability of 
the community; therefore, it did not give the green light to the Centre for hosting big community 
events. Yet with the success of several large events, the Committee made compromises to 
create more space for action for the Centre.  
The Chengnan Town Government attempted to control personnel rights, resources 
and service portfolios of the Centre. It held a very prudent attitude toward its activities, which 
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encouraged residents’ participation. However, through negotiation between the two sides, the 
social service agency secured its autonomy over personnel issues. Furthermore, the voluntary 
mutual-aid team, an organization for self-governance, was established with the help of the 
agency. It provides an example of the benefits of involving residents in social governance. As 
a result, the local government made further compromises and afforded more autonomy to the 
Centre.  
At the same time, the needs of the government were also evolving from only focusing 
on fostering and incubating NGOs to promoting the professionalism of their work and 
developing a team of high quality social workers: in turn creating a more favourable 
environment for NGOs. In the process of negotiating with governments at different levels, the 
Centre recognized its capabilities and limitations, made a breakthrough in improving its 
autonomy, expanded its service categories, enlarged its domains of action and looked beyond 
the city to attain greater space for action and more resources. 
 Third, the GO-NGO boundary is multi-layered, with different layers formed between 
NGOs and governments of various levels. To residents, the Neighbourhood Committee is 
often viewed as the mouthpiece of government. It is predominantly seen as an administrative 
body. However, neighbourhood committees are autonomous in nature, with blurred 
boundaries with NGOs. In our study, the head of B Neighbourhood Committee was initially 
wary about the social service agency. However, through considerable engagement with it, she 
is now the individual who best understands its work concepts, service guidelines and work 
practices. The logic of the Neighbourhood Committee is pragmatic in nature; as long as the 
Centre’s work is effective, it will make corresponding compromises, blurring the division 
between it and NGOs.  
As the needs of the city government are similar to those of the Centre, so the former 
makes adjustments. However, the government is more conservative. Despite the interaction 
between it and the Centre helping it recognize the latter’s capabilities, it is still wary. This 
restricts Chengnan’s action space and creates a distinct GO-NGO boundary. After repeated 
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interactions, both sides have made compromises, while remaining committed to their 
principles. The result is an ever-changing boundary between NGOs and government.  
 Fourth, this discussion furthers understanding of autonomy and its relation to GO-
NGO boundaries. The three dimensions of the autonomy of NGOs and GOs are closely 
correlated with the boundary. Autonomy enables NGOs to build confidence and push the 
boundary set by the government. In other words, autonomy is the foundation for more space 
for action: redefining the boundary. When enhanced, this is conducive to setting the boundary 
and expanding NGOs’ space. 
 
Conclusion 
The founding of Chengnan Social Work Service Centre arose from the needs of the city 
government in our case study. In the wake of the 18th and 19th CPC Central Committees’ 
reforms on ‘social governance’, the city government was aware of calls to devolve power and 
create space for action to NGOs, such as Chengnan Social Work Service Centre, a 
community-based social service organization. However, the analysis here reveals how, in its 
early days, the social service agency was a top-down product rolled out by the city 
government. It subsequently fell under the influence of an assertive government which exerted 
strong control over it.  
Notwithstanding this, some space for action was allowed in the institutional 
environment fostering NGOs. Distinct institutions and various needs of government at different 
levels meant that NGOs adopted different strategies in order to pursue opportunities for 
survival and development, and secure greater space for action and more autonomy. The GO-
NGO boundary is continually formed and reformed through the interaction between NGOs and 
governments at various levels, as both sides adhere to principles or make compromises.  
 However, in the case of administrative logic replacing social self-organization, what 
factors will shape the government’s devolution of power and space? To answer this, NGOs 
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need to consider the manner of their operation from the perspective of the administrative logic 
of the government. Action space released by an assertive government is the result of 
awareness of diversified social needs and pressure for the innovation needed for better 
governance.  
This case study has shown that government at town level embraces a more stubborn 
attitude towards NGOs, while the Civil Affairs Bureau proved more open-minded. This is easy 
to understand, because the development of NGOs is directly related to government’s 
performance. Amongst a myriad of responsibilities, government faces pressure to maintain 
social stability and territorial jurisdiction. This forces town government to be prudent about all 
potential risks. On the other hand, reform and innovation in social governance is usually 
carried out by the county government and government divisions. For this reason, town 
government finds it difficult to mobilize sufficient resources to exercise social governance, 
reform and innovation. With the prospect of risks instead of benefits, government adopts a 
cautious attitude towards NGOs. This explains why in this case, the government of Chengnan 
Town was initially wary of the Centre; expedient and driven by opportunism (He, 2010).  
From the perspective of the different institutional logic of various divisions, NGOs’ 
space for action allowed by government divisions at various levels and of different 
departments will vary. The influence of the administrative logic of government over NGOs 
determines their space for action and autonomy. Thus, capability-building NGOs funded by 
government develop autonomy in a complicated manner, shaped by competing forces of top-
down government and grassroots action. In order to develop the autonomy of NGOs, Huang 
& Ji believe this dual mechanism of “non-synergetic governance-strategic response” creates 
a unique mechanism in contemporary China.  
Under the framework of “non-synergetic governance”, social factors have often been 
overlooked in the process of institutional development. At the same time, the institutional 
environment has long reinforced the orientation of development on the basis of programmes 
and issue-centred approaches, downplaying attention on NGOs’ autonomy (Huang & Ji, 
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2014). This has hampered the development of NGOs in the contemporary era. For social work 
service organizations, such as Chengnan Social Work Service Centre, this initially resulted in 
a lack of autonomy. 
 Amid the different institutional logic of administrative bodies, however, NGOs with 
professional knowledge, skills and concepts have adapted their negotiating strategies based 
on their needs. In the process of interaction with government at different levels, NGOs may 
become concerned about increasing their autonomy. As Saich (2000) posits, through 
negotiation with the state, NGOs will seek to offset the government’s control by deploying 
different strategies and expanding their action space. From the perspective of the government, 
as it delegates power and space for action, NGOs can improve their space for action and 
autonomy and even exert subtle influences over the logic of action by the government.  
 
 This study’s exploration of the action space of a social organization has centred on 
capability-building social service organizations funded by the government. Future work will 
need to extend this to NGOs of other types in other regions, such as those in other parts of 
China with financial strains, or organizations that directly offer social services.  
The findings in this article are distinctive. Capability-building social service 
organizations are mainly engaged in services that involve the participation of residents, and 
community development rather than offering public services to the public. Compared to other 
NGOs, these organizations are more vulnerable. This is because of the limited categories of 
services they offer, their heavy reliance on government resources and poor ability to access 
market resources. For this reason, they take negotiating with the government more seriously. 
In contrast, NGOs, such as nursing homes that directly offer public services, are more capable 
of securing market resources and income from service delivery.  
 A call for future research to build on this study and examine NGOs of other types 
in other regions is important because our case study is located in southern Jiangsu, where 
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local governments have sufficient financial resources for the procurement of services offered 
by NGOs. However, in the central and east regions, local governments are often short of 
funding for social services or under financial strain; therefore, the relationships between them 
and NGOs are likely to exhibit different characteristics. Moreover, future work is needed to 
extend this study’s analysis of the attributes of the boundary of action and its relations with 
autonomy in other contexts. However, for now, this preliminary study’s findings show how, in 
a government-dominated institutional environment, the devolution of power has certain 
positive impacts on the development of NGOs in contemporary China. 
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